Employer of Last Resort? South Africa’s Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) by Charles Meth
Working Paper Series
Number 58
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit
by
Charles Meth
Employer of Last Resort?  South Africa’s Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP)About the Author(s) and Acknowledgments
This paper was inspired and informed by the work done by Anna McCord.  Her extensive knowledge and 
insights have helped to improve my understanding of the subject, and, I hope, to sharpen the critique of-
fered of this, South Africa’s largest job-creating initiative.  Thanks are also due to Isobel Frye of the Studies 
in Poverty and Inequality Institute (SPII) for the opportunity and encouragement (intellectual and finan-
cial) to work in the field of active labour market policies (ALMPs), an opportunity that led indirectly to the 
production of the present paper.  It is to Murray Leibbrandt that I owe the suggestion that the paper be 
written.  His penetrating comments on the first draft obliged me to rewrite a significant chunk of it.  My 
indebtedness to him is substantial.  Debbie Budlender commented usefully on a final draft, a much ap-
preciated contribution.  The generous support of the Ford Foundation-sponsored Public Works Research 
Project in Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) in the University of Cape 
Town, is gratefully acknowledged.  Needless to say, the errors in the paper are all my very own.
Recommended citation
Meth, C. (2011). Employer of Last Resort?  South Africa’s Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). A 
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper Number 58. Cape Town: SALDRU, 
University of Cape Town
ISBN:   978-0-9869892-9-2 
© Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, UCT, 2011
Working Papers can be downloaded in Adobe Acrobat format from www.saldru.uct.ac.za.  
Printed copies of Working Papers are available for R15.00 each plus vat and postage charges. 
Orders may be directed to:  
The Administrative Officer, SALDRU, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, 







Research Affiliate, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit,  
University of Cape Town 








South  Africa’s  largest  active  labour  market  intervention  (ALMP)  is  the  Expanded  Public 
Works  Programme  (EPWP).  Its  first  five‐year  phase  has  been  completed  and  a  second 
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South Africa, unusually for a middle-income developing country, dispenses huge numbers 
(almost 14 million in 2009/10) of means-tested categorical social grants.  Most numerous 
among the recipients are the caregivers of children (the Child Support Grant); followed by the 
aged (State Old Age Pensions), and then by the disabled (Disability Grants).  There is, 
however, no social protection in the form of grants for people aged between 18 and 60 years 
of age in South Africa who have the good fortune not to be disabled, and the misfortune to be 
unemployed,
2, or to have an income that falls below subsistence levels (the working poor). 
 
The problem of what to do about the able-bodied working-age poor is of ancient vintage (de 
Schweinitz, 1972 [1943]; Garraty, 1979),
3 yet nowhere can it be said to have been wholly 
satisfactorily resolved.  The social protection systems of North-West European countries are 
probably the nearest thing to adequate solutions that have been found (Goodin et al, 2001).  
South Africa is a long way from such achievements – the closest government gets to 
addressing this problem directly is by the provision of ‘work opportunities’ on the Expanded 
Public Works Programme (EPWP).  The primary object of the present paper is to examine 
critically, aspects of this, the largest of the substitutes devised by government to fill 
(partially) the gap in the social protection system. 
 
The body of the paper is made up of four sections.  The first of these deals with the socio-
politico-economic context within which the EPWP came into being.  It touches on the 
apparent confusion within the ANC as to what, exactly, the programme is supposed to 
achieve.  Tensions over the nature of the programme, and what can reasonably be expected 
from it, are argued to contribute to programme failures. 
 
The second part of the paper asks what Phase 1 of the EPWP achieved during the five years 
of its existence.  Based on recent EPWP reports, it is concluded that although the income 
generated by the employment offered to some of the unemployed is welcome, as are the 
assets created, the programme made no lasting impression on unemployment.  This section 
also takes a look at the monitoring and evaluation system designed for the programme, 
showing how faulty survey design in one of the instruments can undermine well-meaning 
attempts to monitor progress. 
 
The  third part of the paper looks at the relatively recently announced, and much more 
ambitious second phase of the programme.  (Announced, it may be added, amid boasts of the 
                                                 
1 This paper has been extracted from a longish research report on active labour market policies (Meth, 2010).  
The paper differs somewhat from the chapter in the research report, but the substance of the argument has been 
maintained. 
2 Most of those who have formal sector employment are covered by the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF).  
At any given moment, however, among the four million or so officially unemployed, there are perhaps 250 000 
recipients of benefits.  The small minority among the unemployed who receive qualify for UIF benefits receive 
them for a limited period.  The maximum period is about eight months, but mean periods are much shorter 
because low-paid workers, who are the most numerous claimants, do not build up sufficient entitlements 
through contributions.  After entitlements have been exhausted, former UIF beneficiaries receive no ‘handouts’ 
(as the critics of social grants are fond of calling grants). 
3 As Handler (2003, p.217) reminds us, in England, the Statute of Labourers of 1342 “… prohibited the giving 
of alms to ‘sturdy beggars’ ”.  Since that time, the problem of what to do about the able-bodied poor has 
exercised the minds of the authorities on innumerable occasions, often with disastrous consequences for the 
poor.   2
contribution it is to make to the goal of halving unemployment in the country).  What little is 
known of the goals of Phase 2 of the EPWP is subjected to scrutiny. 
 
In the fourth part, attention is focused on the ability of Phase 2 of the EPWP to reduce 
unemployment levels.  The potential contribution of the programme to government’s goal of 
halving unemployment by the year 2014 is considered. 
 
A brief conclusion and a few recommendations bring proceedings to an end. 
 
1. The EPWP – South Africa’s largest ALMP
4 (by far) 
 
In fiscal year 2004/2005 Phase 1 of a five-year Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), 
the vehicle for making good the claim to be providing an income source for those who do not 
qualify for social assistance, was launched.
5  The programme’s lead agency is the Department 
of Public Works (DPW),.
6  The first phase, one of whose goals was that of creating one 
million job opportunities between 2004/2005 and 2008/2009, came to an end in March 2009.
7  
In one of the programme’s founding documents one finds this statement: 
 
“Although not explicitly stated as such, the EPWP programme is clearly part of an active 
labour market policy to promote economic participation amongst marginalized work 
seekers.” (DPW, 2005a, p.10) 
 
Whether or not the EPWP is an ‘active’ labour market policy in the strict sense in which the 
term is used in OECD countries is open to debate.  It is argued further below that one of the 
defining characteristics of an ALMP is that it is able to steer (coerce) the unemployed into 
‘suitable’ employment after a spell on ‘benefits’.  Although participation in the EPWP in 
South Africa is voluntary, the absence of any other social protection against unemployment 
could be argued to amount to implicit coercion – accept an EPWP job opportunity or go 
without.  Despite, however, being one of the largest programmes aimed at the unemployed in 
South Africa, as well as the largest single programme that targets youth,
8 even in its Phase 2 
guise, it cannot possibly offer job opportunities to anything other than a small minority of the 
unemployed.  In the absence of an EPWP offer, the unemployed have nothing.  The absence 
of ‘suitable’ jobs thus means that the EPWP is not a ‘true’ ALMP.  Given government’s 
insistence on ‘activation’ (encouraging or coercing individuals into gainful economic 
                                                 
4 An ALMP is an active labour market policy.  Its outstanding characteristic is that it makes receipt of benefits 
absolutely dependent on compliance with stringent conditions.  It is distinguished from ‘passive’ labour market 
policy by the energy with which those conditions are enforced, and by the amount of assistance offered to 
workseekers to enable them to comply with the conditions.  There is a review of the literature on ALMPs in 
Meth (2010) 
5 It represented a scaling-up of a number of small projects. 
6 Phase 1 of the programme was supposed to be more or less self-financing in that most of those employed are to 
be paid from existing funds set aside for infrastructural and other projects.  One intention is that the labour-
intensity of work undertaken be raised.  In practice, during Phase 1 of the EPWP, many municipalities have 
been reluctant to embark on such a course because of uncertainties about the cost implications of doing so. 
7 The one million goal was reached by March 2008, a year ahead of schedule (DPW, 2009a, p.3). 
8 The intention is that 30 per cent of the job opportunities created should be filled by people aged between 15 
and 35 years (DPW, 2009, p.3), a target regularly exceeded in recent years.   3




Phase 2 of the EPWP was recently unveiled by the Minister of Public Works.
10  Referring to 
government’s halving unemployment goal, the minister reportedly told Reuters on 4
th April 
2009 that “It’s going to take a lot of work, it needs a lot of dedication and energy but I think 
it’s achievable by 2014, I’m confident… ”
11  The basis (or part of the basis) of the minister’s 
confidence is apparently government’s plan to create 4.5 million public work opportunities 
(the newspaper article refers to them as ‘jobs’) over the next five years.  By 2014, it is 
intended that 1.5 million work opportunities, each lasting 100 working days, on average, will 
be provided by Phase 2 of the EPWP.
12 
 
Asked if the timing of the “… launch was politically opportunistic before a general election 
on April 22”, the minister said that: 
 
“If somebody doesn’t like us doing it before the election that’s tough.  I am saying there 
are people that don’t know what they are going to eat tonight.  There are children going 
hungry and I cannot allow a situation where we dilly-dally until whenever… ”  (Mail & 
Guardian online, 6 April 2009) 
 
Since Phase 1 was due to be completed by the end of March 2009 (DPW, 2009a, p.3), the 
timing was coincidental.
13  It is too much, however, to expect that an opportunity to boast 
                                                 
9 It is possible that here, I am being excessively nice.  Writing about direct employment programmes in Latin 
America, for example, Reinecke (2005, p.166) says simply that: “Active labour market policies may be defined 
as those that directly address the labour market.  Their principal objective is to reduce unemployment and to 
provide access to productive work for the greatest possible number of workers.  Passive policies, by contrast, 
address the labour market only indirectly, by increasing aggregate demand in the economy or providing income 
for those who lose their jobs.” 
10 Part of this section of the paper was written shortly before the general election in South Africa on 22
nd April 
2009.  The Minister of Public Works (Geoff Doidge) was one of very few ministers who were re-appointed by 
President Zuma, making it unnecessary to edit the paper to make him the former minister.  Doidge did not 
survive Zuma’s October 2010 cabinet reshuffle.  A piece of analysis by Mandy Rossouw in the Mail & 
Guardian, on 1
st November 2010 said of the reshuffle that: “The most suspicious exit is that of Geoff Doidge, 
who was known to play by the rules in his Public Works portfolio.  Is his departure linked to his decision to 
investigate the controversial office-block tender signed off by police commissioner Bheki Cele? 
11 See the article “SA on track to halve unemployment by 2014” by Wendell Roelf, in the Mail & Guardian 
online, 6 April 2009. 
12 This, the article points out, amounts 610 000 full-time equivalents, the number one would obtain if a full 
working year is assumed to number 246 days.  This is quite a long working year – it includes only ten public 
holidays, and a five-day vacation.  The number of working days that make up a full-time year must have been 
specified in some EPWP document – I have not, however, come across any references to it.  The Code of Good 
Practice for EPWP workers stipulates that their employment is governed by the relevant provisions of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (DoL, 2002, Section 3.2).  This means that EPWP workers, in addition to being 
paid for any public holiday that occurs during their spell of employment, must also be allowed to take one day’s 
paid leave for every 17 days worked.  Under such conditions, a full working year would number about 230 days.  
For the purposes of the investigation conducted in this section of the paper, that will be assumed to be the length 
of a working year. 
13 As is usual with politicians the world over, when pressed, they become evasive.  Instead of answering the 
question, the minister avoided doing so by a display of compassion for the suffering of the poor, which although 
it may have been sincere, was irrelevant – his concerns about people not knowing where their next meal is 
coming from, and about children going hungry, are shared by almost everyone.  Announcement of his intentions 
does not feed them – it is implementation that counts (for the fortunate few among them).  The simple answer to 
the reporter’s question, is that Phase 2 was announced when it was, because Phase 1 had come to an end a few 
days before.   4
about the achievements of Phase 1, and to raise hopes by reeling off the even bigger things 
planned for Phase 2, would be wasted by government, as, of course, it was not.  One aim of 
the analysis that follows is to determine, if possible, how secure the basis is on which these 
boasts rest. 
 
In the year 2001, while serving as a member of the Taylor Committee, a body set up to 
inquire into a “Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa” (DoSD, 2002), a 
message from the higher reaches of government (presumably the Treasury) fluttered onto my 
desk.  It bore the instruction ‘investigate the feasibility of introducing workfare in South 
Africa’, or words to that effect.  It happened that, at the time, I was reading a literature that 
was highly critical of workfare as we knew it – having been particularly impressed by one of 
the contributors to the debate, Joel Handler (2000; 2003; 2008).  My immediate response was 
to pen a diatribe, lamenting the ignorance of those who were unaware of the racist 
connotations of the measures (ushered in by President Clinton’s administration) designed to 
rid the United States of the mainly African American ‘welfare queens’ (President Reagan’s 
description) who reproduced irresponsibly to enable them to stay ‘on welfare’ (Handler, 
2008, p.1).  Suitably toned down, and without the back-of-envelope estimates I made of the 
numbers of public work programme job slots required to address South Africa’s 
unemployment problem, let alone that of the working poor, a summary of the diatribe found 
its way into the Taylor Committee report (DoSD, 2002, pp.39-40). 
 
At about the time the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) was being planned, the 
Basic Income Grant (BIG) proposed by the Taylor Committee was in the process of being 
(informally) rejected by government.  A campaign for the BIG, originally a Cosatu proposal, 
sputtered on for a few years, but never really gained much support or made much headway 
against a united front of government and business objections.  Instead, with a general election 
in the offing (2004), and unemployment skyrocketing (the official rate hit 31 per cent in 
March 2003, falling ever so slowly thereafter),
14 plans were being made to launch a palliative 
measure whose big numbers (1  000  000 work opportunities) even if they made little 
impression on unemployment, made good public relations material. 
 
The ANC ‘in conference’ (the final arbiter of South African government policy) has long 
been antipathetic to the notion of social grants (referred to disparagingly as ‘handouts’ or ‘the 
dole’) for the working-age able-bodied poor.
15  Having before them the examples of 
‘workfare’ in the US, and the somewhat less punitive welfare-to-work policies of the UK, but 
unable, for reasons given below, to emulate such policy regimes, the ANC ‘in government’ 
has resisted all claims for universal social grants, insisting that grants for the working age 
poor be made conditional upon the recipient becoming economically active.  So, in addition 
to its other claimed advantages, the EPWP solves the problem of getting income that is not in 
the form of a ‘handout’ into the hands of the poor. 
 
Underlying welfare-to-work policies is the proposition that most people would prefer paid 
employment to social grants as primary source of income.
16  As long as the work is ‘decent’, 
                                                 
14 See Statistical release P0210, 26 September 2005, p.2. 
15 The ANC’s distaste for social grants as a means of addressing the poverty caused by unemployment is not 
new – in the very first State of the Nation address in the new South Africa, former President Mandela said that: 
“The Government is determined forcefully to confront the scourge of unemployment, not by way of handouts 
but by the creation of work opportunities.” (Presidency, 2004a) 
16 Strong emphasis is placed upon this aspect of social policy reform in the UK.  The Freud Report, for example, 
citing evidence that ‘work is good for your health and well-being’ (Waddell and Burton, 2006), argues that a   5
and those the policy seeks to ‘activate’ are capable of surviving in the world of work, it is 
difficult to disagree with the argument.  Whether or not the means used to encourage (or 
coerce, as the case may be) people to make the transition from unemployed or non-employed 
into employment, are found to be ethically acceptable, depends on a variety of factors, which, 
although both interesting and important, need not concern us here because in South Africa, 
the implementation of welfare-to-work policies such as one finds in the UK is impossible.  
This is so by virtue of (a) the absence of the jobs into which the unemployed and 
economically inactive may be placed, and (b) the absence of the resources (institutional and 
human) to place them, even if such jobs existed. 
 
While it is true to say that a full-scale activation programme like that seen in the UK would 
be impossible in South Africa, there is still a capacity to coerce some significant proportion 
of the working-age poor into accepting the only form of social protection available to them – 
public works.
17  This arises because even though in South Africa, formal compulsion through 
labour market institutions (e.g., labour centres) is not possible, the huge excess supply of 
people demanding work means that access has to EPWP work opportunities is rationed.  That 
raises a number of questions, several of them of a complex ethical nature, such as that of who 
is favoured by being given a work opportunity?  None of them will be pursued here. 
 
Getting back to the term ‘workfare’, one meaning of it refers to the practice of making 
welfare recipients work for their benefits.
18  In developing countries, in the hands of the 
World Bank, this portmanteau word acquired a slightly different meaning, being used to 
describe the act of offering paid employment opportunities on public works programmes 
(PWPs).  Lacking social grant systems (and the fiscal capacity to fund grants), ‘workfare’ is 
supposed to function in these counties as a form (limited) of social security for the 
unemployed.  Offering a tepid defence of the effectiveness of this instrument, the Bank’s 
World Development Report 2000/2001, sub-titled Attacking Poverty, opens the proceedings 
thus: 
 
“Workfare programs.  Public work programs are a useful countercyclical instrument for 
reaching poor unemployed workers.  They can easily be self-targeting by paying wages 
below market rates.”  (World Bank, 2001, p.155) 
 
To give the Bank its due, I have yet to across a statement in any of its publications claiming 
that PWPs are anything but short-term measures, suitable only for addressing crisis situations.  
                                                                                                                                                        
failure on the part of government to overcome a past reluctance to engage with ‘those furthest from the labour 
market’ could be viewed as a dereliction of duty (Freud, 2007, p.5). 
17 Many, possibly most of them, are likely to be so desperate for income that they would accept EPWP work 
opportunities under almost any conditions. 
18 Although workfare is American in origin, some of its nastier characteristics have made their way overseas.  In 
the 2009 welfare reform legislation in the UK, one of the proposed changes would have seen some of those who 
have received the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for two years, shifted into a mandatory ‘work for your benefits’ 
programme.  That, as objectors have pointed out, would see recipients being paid about £1.70 per hour, £4 per 
hour less than the minimum wage (Kennedy and Morgan, 2009, p.24).  The Labour Party often stood accused of 
imposing Conservative Party policy proposals on a hapless electorate.  The ‘workfare’ trick, proposed in the 
Reform Bill, although apparently not taken directly from the Conservatives, came straight out of the centre-right 
think-tank Policy Exchange.  The 2004 paper in which this proposal was aired is cited by Kennedy and Morgan 
(2009, p.110). 
Frank Field, former Minister of State in the Department of Social Security as it then was, came out strongly in 
favour of workfare for 18-24 year-olds.  See the article “Field calls for workfare system to force the young to 
earn benefit” by Patrick Wintour in the Guardian, 27 February 2009.   6
The summary, for example, of a seminal work on active labour market policies by 
Betcherman et al (2004), for the Bank, has this to say of PWPs: 
 
“Public works programs. These can be an effective short-term safety net, but public 
works do not improve participants’ future labor market prospects.”  (2004, p.ii) 
 
South Africa’s programme sets out to achieve precisely the opposite of what experience 
elsewhere suggests is possible.  Approved by Cabinet late in 2003, the EPWP was launched 
in all nine provinces by September 2004, with the target of creating one million ‘work 
opportunities’ over a five-year period.  The intention, according to former President Mbeki, 
was that those taking part, “…. the unemployed, particularly those who were marginalised 
from the mainstream of the economy… ” would: 
 
“…. gain skills while they are employed and increase their capacity to continue working 
elsewhere once they leave the programme… ”  
 
Senior EPWP personnel, aware, more or less from the outset, of the limits of what the 
programme could be expected to achieve, were at pains to prevent overblown claims being 
made for what it could achieve.  In an interview in March 2005, EPWP coordinator Shaun 
Phillips, said that: 
 
“The EPWP is not a solution for poverty in South Africa … The main aim is to create job 
opportunities and improve the level of education and training.”
19 
 
Not long after that statement was made, however, the Policy Discussion Document on ‘Social 
transformation’ for the ANC’s historic Polokwane conference in December 2007, informed 
members (and the world at large) that: 
 
“To respond to the plight of the poor who do not qualify for social assistance, government 
has set up Public Works Programmes to draw the unemployed into productive and gainful 
employment while also delivering training to increase the capacity of participants to earn 
an income once they leave the programme.”  (ANC, 2007, p.4) 
 
According to the most recent poverty estimates for South Africa, there were more than 13 
million people between the ages of 16 and 59 years living on an income of less R515 per 
capita per month in 2008.
20  Most of them would have been able-bodied; some would have 
been numbered among the working poor, and many of them would have been living in 
workerless households.  Even if the poverty line were lowered to somewhere near bare 
subsistence, the poor would still have numbered many millions. 
 
Recognising and acknowledging the limits of the EPWP’s capacity to ‘respond to the plight 
of the poor’, is crucial to the design and implementation of policy that is capable of tackling 
such an awesome task.  Unlike ANC politicians and sundry hacks, EPWP management is, as 
noted above, usually at pains to dispel the perception that the EPWP is a “panacea” for “the 
unemployment problem of the country…” (DPW, 2007)  A typical warning notes that the 
EPWP: 
                                                 
19 This quote and the one above by Mbeki are from a Buanews release dated 11
th March 2005.  Downloaded 
from www.southafrica.info/about/social/publicworks.htm.  Buanews is a South African government news 
service. 
20 Estimated from the results in Table 3.10 and 3.15 on pp.35 and 38 of Leibbrandt et al, 2010.   7
 
  “is but one of a range of government interventions 
  not designed to address demand for work, but is supply led: amount of work depends 
on government line function budgets, [and that,] 
  [a] different design required if EPWP is to meet demand for work from unskilled 
labour” (DPW, 2007) 
 
Of particular importance, the second of these bullet points makes it clear that the number of 
work opportunities is a function of budgetary allocations.  These go to a few departments for 
execution of projects at national level, while the bulk of the remainder is allocated through 
the provinces and municipalities.
21  The Department of Public Works has little or no direct 
say over allocation.
22  Total budgetary allocation falls a long way short of the sum required to 
provide work for all of those without jobs who declare themselves willing and able to work.  
Thus although the EPWP has taken to describing itself as an “employer of last resort” (DPW, 
2009c; 2010), this comes on top of an acknowledgement elsewhere that it cannot offer 
employment to anything more than a small fraction of the unemployed.
23  In line with this 
view is the recognition that: 
 
“The EPWP will not solve the structural unemployment problem.  It is merely one 
element within a broader government strategy to reduce poverty through the alleviation 
and reduction of unemployment.”
 24 
 
One can understand the political class trying to spin the fig-leaf of social protection provided 
by the EPWP into an all-enveloping blanket, but the attempt to do so leads to confusion.  
McCord (2008) has argued that: 
 
“… conceptual confusion about the nature of PWPs is contributing to inappropriate policy 
choice, programme design errors, and even inappropriate expectations on the part of 
implementers.” (2008, p.4) 
 
After surveying the international literature, and after examining more than 200 public works 
programmes (PWPs) worldwide, from among the “highly heterogeneous form[s] of 
intervention”, she distilled a PWP typology consisting of four basic varieties.  The 
characteristics of each mark its suitability for one aspect or another of a social protection 
regime – if end-goal and instrument are not aligned, problems may be anticipated.  To jump 
ahead in our story, to expect skills and training of any significance to be imparted to people 
who work for 70 days on a rural road maintenance project, in the expectation that it will 
“increase the capacity of [anything other than a tiny minority, CM] participants to earn an 
income once they leave the programme” is to engage in wishful thinking. 
 
                                                 
21 Financing arrangements vary – large programmes such as provincial and municipal infrastructure were 
required to fund additional employment (increasing labour intensity) from the Provincial Infrastructure and 
Municipal Infrastructure Grants (PIG and MIG).  In Phase 1 of the EPWP there were no additional budgetary 
allocations.  Attempting to increase labour intensity in this manner, as we shall see below, led to problems. 
22 It does, however head the task team and it commissions the consultants who come up with the relevant 
numbers. 
23 An interim report noted that the EPWP reached a mere 11 per cent of the officially unemployed, or six per 
cent of the unemployed according to the ‘broad’ definition (DPW, 2008). 
24 Statement downloaded on 12
th July 2009 from the EPWP website home page: 
http://www.epwp.gov.za/index.asp?c=Welcome.   8
So inadequate is this poor substitute for the truly comprehensive social protection system to 
the creation of which the South African government regularly commits itself (and which it is 
bound, in terms of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, to provide), that the South African 
government’s insistent use of the measure as one of the major tools for tackling mass, long-
term unemployment, and the income poverty with which that is associated, is intriguing, to 
say the very least.
25 
 
2.  Phase 1 of the EPWP: what did it achieve? 
 
A full-scale assessment of the performance of any substantial policy intervention is a major 
enterprise – taking stock of the achievements of Phase 1 of the EPWP is no exception.  To 
produce a good assessment is no simple task – the EPWP Five Year Report (DPW, 2009b), a 
substantial effort, backed by significant resources, including access to all the available data, 
falls well short of the standard one would expect – the photographs are plentiful and good, 
but the level of technical expertise on display leaves much to be desired.  If, with access to 
almost everything of relevance, insiders are not capable of doing a decent job, their inability 
to do so should serve to remind outsiders of the need for modesty in what they can expect to 
achieve without such resources. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation techniques are well established the world over, and have a suitably 
large literature to prove it.  In this section of the paper, we look briefly at the monitoring and 
evaluation programme designed for the EPWP.  We then make use of one item in the long list 
recommended by the designers of the M&E programme – the regularly published EPWP 
quarterly reports – to perform simple “performance monitoring”, to see “how well 
programme objectives are being achieved” Betcherman et al (2004, p.13).  After that, we 
look at the story told about training in the monitoring and evaluation section of the EPWP 
Five Year Report (DPW, 2009b).  The section ends with a critical overview of one of 
instruments that was supposed to be used for monitoring, the (then) bi-annual Labour Force 
Surveys (LFSs). 
 
Monitoring and evaluation: Background 
 
As I have pointed out elsewhere (Meth, 2009, p.29) the section on the monitoring and 
evaluation exercise carried out for Phase 1, published in the EPWP Five Year Report (DPW, 
2009b) is “deeply disappointing”.  The purpose of this section of the paper is to provide a few 
introductory observations about monitoring and evaluation processes in general and aspects 
of the EPWP’s M&E process in particular.  It is not the intention to engage in any depth with 
                                                 
25 This is all the more so in view of the fact that government itself long ago acknowledged the superiority of 
social grants over public work programmes as a means for alleviating income poverty (PCAS, 2003, p.19).  The 
sentiment has not changed over time – when it is uttered, however, it invariably has tacked onto to it, the need to 
link grants to economic activity.  Here it is articulated by President Zuma in the State of the Nation address on 
3
rd June 2009: 
“While creating an environment for jobs and business opportunities, government recognises that some citizens 
will continue to require state social assistance.  Social grants remain the most effective form of poverty 
alleviation.  As of 31 March 2009, more than 13 million people received social grants, more than 8 million of 
whom are children. 
We are mindful of the need to link the social grants to jobs or economic activity in order to encourage self-
reliance amongst the able-bodied.” (Presidency, 2009a)   9
that process – indeed, it must be acknowledged that by comparison with the set of activities 
involved in a thorough review, the analysis below barely scratches the surface.  That 
notwithstanding, the exploration still manages to yield some interesting findings. 
 
A useful way to begin is to flesh out the bare bones of the four sectors into which EPWP 
activities are divided, by listing briefly some of the activities tackled under each head.   
Projects originate in all three spheres of government; national, provincial and municipal, and 
(a much smaller number) in the non-state sector.  Projects fit into one of four categories, 
listed below: 
 
  Infrastructure:– minor roads (construction and maintenance), pipelines, stormwater 
drains, sidewalks 
  Environmental:– alien plant elimination, coastline rehabilitation, Working for Water, 
Working on Fire, Working for Wetlands, 
  Economic:– income-generating projects and programmes to utilise government 
expenditure on goods and services to provide the work experience component of small 
enterprise learnership and/or incubation programmes, (one target of Phase 1 was to 
create 400 SMMEs) 
  Social:– creating work opportunities in public social programmes, e.g. Home and 
Community-Based Care (HCBC) workers, Community Health Workers (CHW) and 
Early Childhood Development (ECD) workers (DPW, 2009b, p.22) 
 
Active labour market policies are but one among many different types of policy that require 
the scrutiny of monitoring and evaluation.  Conducting such exercises on policy interventions 
follows well established steps.  The Betcherman et al piece referred to above, although it 
claims only to provide a brief coverage of the more important aspects of evaluation (2004, 
p.13), manages to present a fairly comprehensive introduction to the pitfalls of monitoring 
and evaluation, a process that consists essentially of three activities.  They are: 
 
  “ process evaluations  these focus on how well a programme is delivered 
  performance monitoring  these focus on how well programme objectives are being 
achieved 
  impact evaluations  when properly carried out, these can identify the effects of 
programmes on participants.  Coupled with cost information, they can disclose net 
benefits to participants, to government, and sometimes to the “broader labor market 
and society.” 
 
Relatively simple to execute, even in countries with “low administrative and analytical 
capacity”, the first two measures are important for improving programme “effectiveness”.  
Reliable impact evaluations, however, “… require careful methodological design, good data, 
and, for some methods, sophisticated econometric techniques ….” (Betcherman et al, 2004, 
p.13). 
 
Real net impacts of programmes cannot be established by tracking participant post-
programme experience (Betcherman et al, 2004, p.13).  The major difficulty confronting the 
analyst is that of attempting to determine a counterfactual, i.e., to answer the question of what 
would have happened if the participant had not taken part in a programme (to the participant 
and in the economy more generally).  This may be illustrated by reference to the three well-
known problems associated with wage subsidies.  They are: 
   10
“Deadweight Loss: Program outcomes are no different from what would have happened 
in the absence of the program.  For example, wage subsidies place a worker in a firm that 
would have hired the worker in the absence of the subsidy. 
Displacement Effect: This usually refers to displacement in the product market.  A firm 
with subsidized workers increases output but displaces output among firms without 
subsidized workers. 
Substitution Effect: A worker hired in a subsidized job is substituted for an unsubsidized 
worker who otherwise would have been hired.  The net employment effect is thus zero.” 
(Betcherman et al, 2004, p.16)
26 
 
To get at counterfactuals, it is usually necessary to construct a control group of non-
participants with similar characteristics to the participants in any particular programme or set 
of programmes.  Essential for adequate evaluation, construction of this group is the major 
challenge, made more challenging still by the fact that certain characteristics are not easily 
quantifiable.  Experimental and quasi-experimental techniques may be used.  The first 
randomly assigns similar individuals to one or other status (participant, control).  There are 
obvious limits to the feasibility of conducting large-scale experiments when new ALMPs are 
introduced, or existing ones revised, not the least of which are the problems involved in 
playing with real people’s lives. 
 
For this reason, quasi-experimental techniques are more common.  Typically, these draw on 
survey data to construct a control group of individuals with similar characteristics to 
programme participants.  Steps to control for differences between the latter and the former 
groups must be taken to ensure that results are as free from bias as possible.  This is not the 
place to discuss the numerous problems confronting the would-be evaluator – suffice it to say 
that potentially, obstacles are encountered at every step, from design to interpretation by the 
users for whom the studies are conducted.
27  Among the things that can be done by 
governments implementing ALMPs is that of attempting to ensure that the national statistics 




Reference above to ‘sophisticated econometric techniques’ echoes the statement by 
Betcherman et al (2004, p.6) that even though ALMPs have “economic, social and political 
objectives” the primary criteria by which activation programmes are judged are economic 
(the nature of the relevant indicators being implicit within the programme).  A review of a 
                                                 
26 On that question, the Five Year Report has the following to say: “In the case of the EPWP, there was little 
reason to believe that there would be substantial offsetting impacts in relation to the short-term job opportunities 
created, as most of these jobs would simply not have existed in the absence of the EPWP.  Only once 
beneficiaries exit the programmes and either enter formal employment or become self-employed, these effects 
are likely to become relevant.  Although complex and costly to measure the impacts at this late stage, the 
longitudinal studies would at least pick up on some of these effects, as would the aggregate impact analysis.” 
(DPW, 2009b, p.65).  Research into this matter in the future is vital.  Even if only ten per cent of the 4.5 million 
job opportunities the EPWP Phase 2 is planning to create, result in jobs in the formal or informal economies, 
there could be significant substitution effects under conditions of demand constraint. 
27 For a taste of the difficulties faced by researchers in constructing control groups, see Beale et al, 2007.  
Another paper worth looking at is that by Thomas (2008).  Using Department for Work and Pension (UK) 
administrative data, the author claims some success for the exotic method developed, but warns that the strength 
of his findings should not be overstated (p.51).  Applicability to other areas of the UK benefits dataset is 
probably very limited.  See also Finn and Schulte, 2008, p.29. 
28 This section relies heavily on Betcherman et al, 2004.  For a more technical treatment of the subject, see 
Schochet and Burghardt (2007), an evaluation of the Job Corps programme in the USA, where such delights as 
propensity scoring are discussed.   11
particular M&E exercise would thus entail checking to see if the standard tools used to test 
whether or not ‘economic’ criteria are being satisfied, have been properly applied.  It would 
also mean looking critically at ‘social and political objectives’ (such ‘prying’ is likely to be 
contentious), and the instruments, if any, that have been used to examine them.  The 
explorations that form the next sections of the paper, although they do touch here and there 
on social objectives, focus mainly on economic criteria. 
 
Although the South African government has long been obsessed with monitoring and 
evaluation, in practical terms, its achievements in the field are modest indeed, primarily 
because of the absence (or weakness if present) of suitable M&E programmes at the policy 
design stage.  Somewhat unusually for a department at the time, the EPWP team appears, at 
least during the initial phase of the project, to have given the important task of designing an 
adequate monitoring and evaluation programme the attention it deserves.  It is not the 
intention here, however, to reproduce a summary of a document that is freely available – the 
briefest of outlines of what was proposed will be sufficient to allow us to tackle the tasks 
outlined above. 
 
Drawn up in collaboration with the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the 
monitoring and evaluation document informs us that the proposed techniques are as follows: 
 
  Cross-sectional surveys of contractors, implementing agents, beneficiaries, 
communities and government departments, to be conducted in years 1, 3 and 5. 
  Longitudinal surveys of beneficiaries six months after their exit from the EPWP, and 
six months thereafter, to be conducted in years 1, 3 and 5. 
  Case studies and completion reports assessing the quality of assets and services, and 
quality of infrastructure against accepted benchmarks, to be conducted in years 1-5. 
  Poverty impact analysis using secondary data and data derived from “surveys 
utilised” to be conducted in years 3 and 5. 
  Aggregate impact analysis to be done using a computable general equilibrium model 
in years 3 and 5. (DPW, 2005a, Table 2, p.vi).
29 
 
Although the programme sketched immediately above stopped short of performing all the 
recommended steps, it was nonetheless fairly comprehensive.
30  The extent to which the 
EPWP management has adhered to the more complex parts of the proposed M&E programme 
(especially the longitudinal survey) has not been made public.   
 
Rather obviously, the quality of analysis depends importantly on the quality of the data on 
which it rests.  To judge by the scattered references in the EPWP documents, data quality is a 
perennial problem.  At a 2007 briefing of the Public Services Select Committee of the 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP), the Chief Director in the DPW responsible for 
monitoring and evaluation, discussed problems of: 
 
“… quality, accuracy and urgency of the data the Department was receiving from 
municipalities and provincial governments.” (DPW, 2007) 
 
                                                 
29 A more detailed presentation of the EPWP’s monitoring and evaluation strategy appears in Chapter 4 of the 
Five Year Report (DPW, 2009b, pp.57-66) 
30 It is not known how much, if any, of the EPWPs M&E programme was paid for by donor funding.   12
Steps taken to address this problem (glanced at in next section of the paper) have yet to take 
effect, as a recent (17 August 2010) overview on Phase 2 of the EPWP, clearly shows.   
Having observed that: “Data capturing capacity was lacking, to report properly on 
implemented projects”, the DPW official conducting the briefing, commenting on the poor 
performance of municipalities, said that this: 
 
“… was due to a range of reasons, such as poor reporting, inaccurate capturing of data, 
poor planning by the implementing body and lack of technical expertise.” (DPW, 2010) 
 
In answer to the question ‘what did Phase 1 of the EPWP achieve?’ the most sensible 
response must be that nobody can say for sure.  It would be useful if some eager PhD 
candidate could lay their hands on all the data collected by the EPWP (by means of freedom 
of information application?), and subject it to careful analysis.  It must be admitted though, 
that even if this were to happen, we would still be some years away from obtaining answers 
to a wide range of intriguing questions. 
 
Monitoring the overall performance in Phase 1 of the EPWP  
 
In this section of the paper we make use of one item in the long list recommended by the 
designers of the M&E programme – the regularly published EPWP quarterly reports – to 
perform simple “performance monitoring”, to see “how well programme objectives are being 
achieved” Betcherman et al (2004, p.13).  Table 1 below, which covers the five years of 
Phase 1 of the EPWP, gives an indication of how far this data source allows us to peer into 
the workings of the programme.  The bare numbers are supplemented by information 
presented by the EPWP to parliamentary committees.  The documents in question reveal a 
quite a lot about the weaknesses and problems faced. 
 
In Table 1, the top three panels present estimates of the number of work opportunities (in 
thousands) to be created (target and achieved) in the various ‘sectors’ into which the EPWP is 
divided; the numbers of person-days of training, and the numbers of person-years of work, 
including training.  These figures are taken directly from the recent EPWP Five Year Report 
(DPW, 2009b), covering all of Phase 1 of the programme.  Estimates of mean numbers of 
days worked, by sector, appear in the bottom panel of the table.  These have been estimated 
on the basis of the assumption that a work year consists of 230 day’s work.  Some of the 
problems involved in such estimations are discussed immediately below. 
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Table 1  Performance of the EPWP, Phase 1 
Net work opportunities – (1000s)  Targets  Achieved  % 
Infrastructure 750 955 127 
Economic 12 20 170 
Environment and culture  200 468 234 
Social 150 174 116 
Overall  1 112 1 618 145 
Person days of training (1000s)  Targets  Achieved  % 
Infrastructure  9 000 3 398 38 
Economic 39 56 143 
Environment and culture  2 005 1 651 82 
Social  4 535 2 082 46 
Overall  15 579 7 186 46 
Person years of work incl. training (1000s)  Targets  Achieved  % 
Infrastructure 250 312 125 
Economic 18 5 26 
Environment and culture  200 114 57 
Social 200 120 60 
Overall 650 551 85 
Person days work (per person)  Targets  Achieved  % 
Infrastructure 77 75 98 
Economic 345 54 16 
Environment and culture  230 56 24 
Social 307 158 51 
Overall 134 78 58 
Source: DPW, 2009b, Table 27, p.110 
 
 
Dividing the numbers of work opportunities by the numbers of person years of work, as is 
done in the fourth panel of the table gives one a crude estimate of person years of work per 
job opportunity (assumed to be filled by one person).  These may be expressed in person days 
in several ways.  The first of these, obtained by multiplying the number of person years of 
work per job opportunity by 230, tells us how many days paid work, on average, each person 
who has a job opportunity, enjoys. 
 
The other method, obtained by multiplying by denominators related to the periodicity of 
survey instruments such as the Labour Force Surveys (LFSs), or their successor, the 
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFSs), could potentially help in the difficult business of 
guessing at how long the calendar period is during which the person would be categorised as 
employed.  If it could be estimated, the latter piece of information may have been useful for 
attempting to guess at the impact of EPWP job opportunities on unemployment levels.  Since 
the QLFSs do not collect EPWP data, and the General Household Surveys (GHSs) to which 
questions on the EPWP have been relegated, are only conducted once yearly, the issue is 
academic. 
 
Without access to records in a comprehensive data base, estimating work durations from total 
numbers of work opportunities and total numbers of person days worked is an hazardous 
business.  This means that the figures in panel 4 of the table are only rough approximations.  
If one wishes to estimate average durations of actual employment in a population that is both 
depleted by those who have completed their work spell, and replenished by new entrants into 
the scheme, and, as is the case of the EPWP, the rate at which job opportunities is increasing   14
(or decreasing), one must obviously only use completed cases.  Although the inaccuracies 
involved in looking at five-year data may be lower than those that result from playing with 
six-month data, the increases in size of annual intakes over the years, and the possibility of 
increasing durations, could still create a misleading picture.  If the data for the most recent 
period in Phase 1 include some large number of incomplete records (those of people who 
have not yet completed their spells of work), the crude means estimated for the period as a 
whole could be quite different from those achieved in the last year of operation of Phase 1 of 
the programme. 
 
A search through EPWP documents, admittedly not exhaustive, failed to disclose any 
reference to a central data base for Phase 1 of the EPWP (which does not necessarily mean, 
of course, that one did not exist).  There are, however, a few references to difficulties in 
collecting data (at which we shall glance below) from the bodies (provincial and municipal) 
responsible for executing the projects designated as EPWP activities.  Given that, one cannot 
simply round on the EPWP’s management, and accuse them of failing to recognise that 
employment durations are key indicators.  If a proper data base existed, it would have in it the 
information necessary to estimate mean durations of all completed spells accurately – only 
those still in the pipeline would be omitted.  Since no trace of such information could be 
found, it is important, when using the figures in panel 4 of Table 1 to bear in mind that they 
could be out by some significant margin.
31 
 
Turning to the results themselves (finally), it may be seen that as measured by net work 
opportunities created overall, Phase 1 over-achieves fairly significantly, a performance that 
has been celebrated by politicians on a number of occasions.
32  They have been somewhat 
                                                 
31 To put this potential error into perspective, however, it is worth noting that even if it were of the order of, say, 
25 per cent (a very large error) it would still imply that the mean duration of employment (person days of work) 
was only 100 days. 
32 One example of a politician bragging, worth quoting length, is to be found in the statement issued by South 
African Government Information on 18th July 2008, under the heading: “Expanded Public Works Programme 
(EPWP) exceeds set target”.  The statement was based on a speech made at an awards ceremony the evening 
before by the then Minister of Public Works, Ms Thoko Didiza. 
This is what the statement reported about the Minister’s remarks on the EPWP’s job opportunities target: 
“Government’s ambitious poverty eradication initiative, the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), has 
reached and surpassed its target a full year before the set deadline. 
When the programme was launched in May 2004, it aimed to draw significant numbers of the unemployed into 
productive work with an objective of creating a million job opportunities by 2009. 
However by the end of April this year, the programme had already created 1 077 801 job opportunities, way 
ahead of its scheduled 31 March 2009, time limit, says Public Works Minister Thoko Didiza. 
“With another twelve months left in the lifespan of the programme, I can confidently say we have outdone 
ourselves in implementing this important national programme,” Didiza said. 
The training target was missed by miles, but instead of explaining this and suggesting ways in which the 
problem could be addressed, all the statement (and the Minister) had to say about the matter was: 
“With regard to training, which forms a critical part of the programme, Didiza said per-person (sic) days set 
aside for training during 2007/08 were 2 082 155, achieving about 54 (sic) of the annual target of at lest (sic) 3 
800 000.  [The minister does not make these errors in her speech]. 
In terms of the Codes of Good Practice for Special Public Works Programmes as gazetted by the Department of 
Labour, beneficiaries should receive at least two days of training out of every 22 days worked.” 
The minister also announced that: 
“… her department was busy working on proposals for the implementation of the second phase of the 
programme, which will influence the adaptation of the programme and set targets for the next five years to 
2014.  
“Cabinet has given us the go ahead to develop these proposals and to present the details by January 2009,” she 
explained.”   15
less forthcoming on the training target, and as far as I can determine, silent on the number of 
person years achieved against those targeted. 
 
In absolute terms, Infrastructure is way ahead in the work opportunity and person-years of 
work created, easily exceeding targets for both.
33  Best performer in the work opportunities 
stakes (in relative terms) was Environment and Culture.  Five core programmes: Sustainable 
Land Based Livelihoods; Working for the Coast; People and Parks; Working for Tourism, 
and Working on Waste, make up the sector.  If we ignore the tiny Economics sector of the 
EPWP, then Environment and Culture also apparently does best on training, scoring over 80 
per cent of target.  Congratulations need to be tempered, however, because by exceeding the 
job opportunities target so handsomely, the training has to be shared among more than twice 
as many people. 
 
For the same reason, the performance of the Environment and Culture sector of the EPWP on 
the duration measure was also poor.  The target for person years of work was 200 000, the 
same as that for job opportunities, giving a targeted mean duration of one year.  Actual 
performance work-years recorded were 114 228, to give an unadjusted performance of about 
57 per cent.  When this is distributed over the number of opportunities actually created, actual 
mean as a percentage of target work days falls to 24 per cent (see panel 4 of Table 1).  The 
fact that the EPWP was able to get people to work in these socially useful areas is cause for 
celebration – training is clearly a problem, as is duration, but this does not necessarily cancel 
out the positive effects of the policy intervention. 
 
Although the Infrastructure sector (component) of the EPWP deserves a pat on the back for 
meeting the job opportunities and work years targets (assuming that the reports by 
participating authorities are to be relied on), its training performance was abysmal.  Training 
will be considered in a little more depth in the following section of the paper. 
 
Returning once more to the performances reported in Table 1, we fix our attention for a 
moment on the results in panel 4.  Keeping in mind what was said above about the difficulties 
of estimating mean employment durations, we note that when actual work opportunities are 
translated into days worked (the 230 day year), that the longest mean duration of employment 
is in the Social sector, followed by Infrastructure.  The 75 days achieved was more or less 
what was targeted.
34  Without this, performance, as measured by mean duration of work 





th April 2009. 
The speech by the Minister of Public Works is reproduced in a Media Statement issued by The Presidency, in 
which the then Deputy-President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka congratulates all concerned.  Ms Didiza’s speech 
also drew attention to the fact that 40 per cent of participants were youths, instead of 30 per cent target.  Media 
Statement Downloaded from http://www.epwp.gov.za/downloads/Ministers_speech.pdf, 19
th April 2009. 
33 Making sense of EPWP documents is not always the easiest of tasks.  The section on ‘Objectives’ in the 
Monitoring and Evaluation chapter of the Five Year Report informs us that:  “At the time [2005], it was 
estimated that the breakdown of work opportunities for the various sectors would be as follows: Infrastructure – 
8%; Environment and Culture – 10%; Social – 40% and Economic – 30%.” (DPW, 2009b, p.58).  It is not 
obvious how one reconciles this with the numbers in Table 1 above. 
34 Sometimes the numbers produced by the EPWP are truly bizarre.  For the 2008/2009 year, for example, the 
Five Year Report informs us that in Infrastructure, ‘Gross work opportunities’ created at Municipal, National 
and Provincial levels, were 218 490; 39 739 and 140 551 respectively.  Corresponding durations were said to 
have been 67; 5 and 67 days respectively.  This generates a total of 398 780 work opportunities.  From these   16
opportunity, would have been truly dismal.  As it is, overall performance (78 days out of a 
targeted 134) is 42 per cent short of what it should have been.  One obvious question comes 
to mind, namely, are the Infrastructure results real, or are they a mixture of 
unknown/unknowable proportions of reality and creative accounting? 
 
In preparation for Phase 2 of the EPWP, as part of the critical analysis carried out by the 
DPW, the department prepared what appears to be a presentation to the members of the 
“Second Economy Strategy Project” in TIPS (the Trade & Industry Policy Strategies research 
institution).  Dated 29 September 2008, and headed “Overview of EPWP Phase 2”, the 
PowerPoint presentation contains a tantalising set of critiques of all sectors of the 
programme.  The page dealing with the Infrastructure sector is reproduced immediately 
below (in italics): 
 
  Meeting job targets but jobs are too short 
  Use of labour-intensive methods remains contentious and seen as high risk 
  Mobilisation of local government who (sic) has the portfolio with the greatest 
potential difficult (sic) 
  Competing priorities (Spending, backlog eradication) 
  Weak institutional processes, procedures and structures 
  Overall capacity constraints 
  Distinction between EPWP and non EPWP projects remains a difficulty 
  Large projects with small LI [labour intensive] Components being reported as 
EPWP 
  DPW has no authority to enforce compliance 
  No incentives for public bodies to increase labour-intensity significantly (DPW, 
2008) (emphasis in original) 
 
None of the problems listed can come as a surprise.  Rather than comment on them all, let us 
content ourselves with noting that the claim in the first bullet point is confirmed by the 
findings reported in Table 1.  Having done that, we can focus our attention on the last bullet-
point.  Earlier on, the absence (or poor quality) of a work opportunity data base was 
lamented.  In the final bullet-point above, the reasons why data are scarce and unreliable 
become clear.  If municipalities and provinces can manipulate results (by manoeuvring in the 
grey area about what constitutes an EPWP project), then the boasting about targets achieved 
in any sector, particularly Infrastructure, needs to be taken with a grain of salt.  More 
important than political point-scoring, however, is the damage likely to be suffered by 
attempts to measure the progress (or otherwise) of the programme.   
 
Training and the EPWP: Much about which to be modest? 
 
Training is supposed to be at the very heart of the EPWP – as the founding document referred 
to above points out: 
 
“The central objective of the EPWP is to alleviate poverty through training of poor 
unemployed people.” (DPW, 2005a, p.31) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
figures, the EPWP manages to estimate an average duration of work opportunity for the sector of 32 days – 
surely it should be 61?  See DPW, 2009b, Table 29, p.112.   17
When one looks at the training proposed for those who fill the majority of the work 
opportunities – workers in infrastructure – one cannot help feeling that it is appropriate for 
the EPWP’s documentation to express such a low expectation of participants finding future 
employment (14 per cent are expected to be able to earn income in the future).  As has been 
shown in Table 1 above, almost 90 per cent of the job opportunities provided in Phase 1 were 
in the Infrastructure and Environmental sectors.  Given the relatively simple nature of the 
tasks to be performed on projects in these sectors (DPW, 2004, pp.2-3), 
35 the training 
provided for ordinary participants (i.e., not the consultants, contractors, supervisors and other 
specialist staff) in projects can hardly be expected to produce skilled workers.  As the same 
publication points out, the 8-12 days paid training provided: 
 
“… is not sufficient to train unskilled labourers to become artisans.” (DPW, 2004, p.9) 
 
Since training an artisan in all but the simplest of trades (bricklaying? plastering?) takes 
years, not days, one hopes that the comment is intended to be ironic.  Some of the training in 
the social sector is spread over lengthy periods – workers in that category are, however, a 
minority of the total employed.  In what follows, we concentrate on the majority, for nearly 
all of whom, training periods are of very short duration. 
 
The legal document laying down the code of good practice for special public works (DoL, 
2002, p.8)) stipulates that in addition to the requisite on-the-job training, participants must be 
given two day’s formal training for every 22 days worked (Section 15.2).  The training 
criteria laid down are as follows: 
 
15.4.  Ensure sustainable training through certification. It is proposed that minimum of 
30% of the training provided should be accredited; 
15.5.  Balance quality of life, functional and entrepreneurship training; 
15.6.  Balance formal training with structured work place learning.  
15.7.  Equip workers with skills that can be used to secure other employment 
opportunities; 
15.8.  Identify possible career paths available to workers exiting the SPWP (DoL, 2002, 
p.8). 
 
Because job opportunities in infrastructure projects last between four and six months, with 
the result that participants are entitled only to 8-12 days of paid formal training, a period in 
which not much can be accomplished, the EPWP team struck an agreement with the 
Department of Labour to create a “generic 10-14 day training course” that would consist of: 
 
“accredited unit standards on: 
  General Life skills, 
                                                 
35 The following extract from the Guidelines for the Implementation of Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Projects 
gives an indication of the type of activities contemplated: 
“The public body must implement the following types of civil infrastructure projects labour-intensively, in 
accordance with these guidelines: 
• low-volume roads (typically less than 500 vehicles per day); 
• sidewalks and non-motorised transport infrastructure 
• stormwater drainage; and 
• trenching 
where such projects contain a significant amount of the construction activities for which the use of labour is 
specified in the Generic Labour Intensive Specification in section 3.3.3 below, i.e. excavation, loading, short-
distance hauling, offloading, spreading, grassing, and stone-pitching.” (DPW, 2005b, p.2).   18
  Awareness of HIV and AIDS 
  Labour markets and the world of work.” (DPW, 2004, p.9)
36 
 
By way of explanation for the failure to deliver this relatively minor service
37 (2.6 million 
days achieved out of a target of 9 million in the infrastructure sector of the EPWP), the 
quarterly
38 report (for the period April-September 2008) says that: 
 
“The overall number of person-days of training that has been provided since the 
commencement of the EPWP is at least 5,9 million training days.  The project has 
achieved 38% towards its 15, 5 million person-days of training target.  Due to the delays 
with funding training from the Department of Labour, the training days targets will not be 
met.” (DPW, 2009a, p.5, emphasis added
39) 
 
This adds to the misfortunes of the target group, and bodes ill as well for the future of the 
EPWP.  One would imagine (hope) that issues of this kind are being addressed in Phase 2 of 
the EPWP.  The Social Transformation discussion document prepared for the 2007 ANC 
conference at Polokwane, trotted out some pious cant about the EPWP increasing “the 
capacity of participants to earn an income once they leave the programme” (ANC, 2007).  
Even if delivery problems are sorted out, for most of the participants, the ability of training of 
such a rudimentary nature to achieve this must be close to zero.
40 
 
A claim was made earlier that the section on the monitoring and evaluation exercise carried 
out for Phase 1 of the EPWP, and published in the Five Year Report (DPW, 2009b) is 
“deeply disappointing”.  An attempt to justify this assertion, as it applies to the story told 
about training, will now be made. 
 
Description in the Five Year Report of the intended shape of the monitoring and evaluation 
exercise stretches over a bit more than eight full pages (DPW, 2009b, Section 4, pp.58-66).  
Presentation of the research findings, excluding those extracted from the LFS, takes up four-
and-a-half pages (Section 5, pp.68-72).  If those few pages were brimful of interesting results 
and other salient information, the brevity of the report would be of no consequence.   
Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Most of Section 5 of the Five Year Report is devoted to a 
discussion of two surveys, a cross-sectional study whose purpose it was to: 
 
“… provide a sample of project level information for detailed monitoring of the EPWP, as 
well as to provide information that would contribute to the evaluation of the programme’s 
impact.” 
                                                 
36 See also DWP, 2005b. 
37 It imparts few, if any marketable skills. 
38 Oddly, the so-called ‘quarterly’ reports cover six month periods. 
39 It is difficult to imagine what purpose that ‘at least’ is supposed to serve, if not to evoke the reader’s 
sympathy. 
40 For a critical analysis of the limited efficacy of the EPWP training programmes, see McCord, 2007a). On 
p.570, for example, she concludes that: “The main factors underlying the limited success of the EPWP 
programme in improving labour market performance are the limited demand for low-skilled and unskilled 
labour, and the fact that the training offered under the auspices of the EPWP is not sufficient to improve the 
employability of participants, or to differentiate them from other low-skilled or unskilled workseekers, once 
they have exited the programme. 
See as well, McCord (2009, p.178), where she concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that the lifeskills 
training that constitutes the bulk of training in the infrastructure sector “will have a significant impact on labour 




“[A] longitudinal survey … aimed at accessing data regarding the employment prospects 
of beneficiaries once they were to exit the EPWP.” (DPW, 2009b, p.68) 
 
Neither the questionnaires nor the research report produced by the EPWP based on these two 
surveys appear to have been published.  All we have is what is published in the Five Year 
Report.  Before taking a look at that, let us reflect for a moment on the variables at the heart 
of the declared aim of the surveys, especially the longitudinal survey, and the analysis based 
on them. 
 
‘Employment prospects’ (or its close relation ‘employability’)
41 are determined by a number 
of variables relating both to the characteristics of the individuals concerned and to the context 
(especially labour market conditions) in which they find themselves.  For individuals, the 
relevant variables are wrapped in a bundle of capabilities, loosely called skills.  The bundle 
includes knowledge, skills and attitudes; the way in which these are used, and the way in 
which they are presented to potential employers.  Given that the apparently simple task of 
defining skill can, in fact, be devilishly difficult, it is only to be expected that assessing how 
the bearer of a particular bundle of capabilities may be expected to fare in the labour market, 
is going to be difficult as well. 
 
Since we do not know how the survey designers framed the questions intended to capture the 
information necessary to measure ‘employability’, we must rely on what is reproduced in the 
Five Year Report.  The signs are not auspicious – from sample design onwards.  For the 
cross-sectional survey, respondents were drawn from participants in 108 projects.  Two 
questionnaires were used, one for project beneficiaries and one for economic beneficiaries, 
apparently the unskilled unemployed and other more skilled personnel, and those in the 
broader society who would benefit from the projects, respectively.  Purposive sampling was 
used, and the sample was stratified according to size and type of project (DPW, 2009b, p.68).  
The latter would presumably locate the project in one or the other of the sectors.  No 
indication of the size of the sample, nor of its breakdown is given.  The sample allegedly “… 
represented the target population… ” (p.68) 
 
From the figures in Table 10 of the Five Year Report, the proportional distributions of net 
work opportunities in 2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09 respectively, may be shown to have 
been 47, 57 and 70 per cent in Infrastructure, 40, 28 and 18 per cent in Environment and 
Culture, and 12, 15 and 11 per cent in the Social Sector (DPW, 2009b, p.34).  So, at the time 
the survey was conducted – mid-January 2007 onwards (2009b, p.68), Infrastructure and 
Environment and Culture accounted for close to 90 per cent of all net work opportunities.  In 
the section of the Five Year Report that presents the results of the cross sectional survey, it is 
stated that: 
 
“The sector with the most participants was the Social Sector, followed by the 
Environment and Culture Sector (30.6%), and the Infrastructure Sector (23.6%).” (DPW, 
2009b, p.69) 
 
                                                 
41 In the discussion in the Report on the usefulness of the LFS as a monitoring device, readers are informed that 
the sample is: “deemed a sufficiently large sample to permit an analysis of the impact of the EPWP on 
employability” (DPW, 2009b, p.61).   20
That was followed by the presentation of a few results, all of which purportedly confirmed 
that the EPWP had brought about improvements in their lives.  Household incomes rose and 
ability to save increased (mean increases quantified), ability to support families improved, as 
did the ability to afford wider range of goods and services.  There were less tangible 
improvements as well, for example, in knowledge and independence (DPW, 2009b, p.69). 
 
After that, the Report moves to the longitudinal survey, first informing us that: 
 
“The low turnover rates [on short-term projects? CM] and other findings indicated the 
availability and willingness of previously unemployed community workers to earn an 
income on these projects.  While the skills earned were perceived as a very positive step 
towards long-term employment and poverty alleviation, the question that required a 
response was whether the time spent on most of these projects was sufficient to develop 
the necessary skills and opportunities for future employment. 
 
All cross-sectional study respondents were tracked and requested to participate in the 
longitudinal study.  A total of 768 beneficiaries were located, and subsequently agreed to 
participate in the longitudinal study.  This phase of the study was conducted 
approximately six months after the cross-sectional interviews were completed.” (DPW, 
2009b, p.69) 
 
Once past the sundry, mainly positive remarks about the programme (like the ‘the skills 
earned were perceived as a very positive step’ referred to above), we come to the heart of the 
matter.  About 55 per cent of those interviewed were still employed by the programme.  Of 
those who had exited the programme, 27 per cent were in employment, roughly half of them 
in full-time jobs (not a bad result, given goal of 14 per cent finding work).  The question of 
what contribution training made to this is left unanswered.  About training, all that the Report 
has to say is the following: 
 
“Of the respondents who still worked for the EPWP, more than a third contended
42 that 
they had received training during the last six months.  Of those who no longer worked 
under the auspices of the EPWP, only 25% had received training in the last six months.
43  
Most of the respondents were confident that the training they had received would enable 
them to obtain other work.  Social Sector respondents seemed to be most confident about 
this, whilst those in the other three sectors were less convinced.” (DPW, 2009b, p.70, 
emphasis added) 
 
No distinction is made in the Report between formal training (such as the ‘Department of 
Labour generic 10-14 day training course’ referred to above) and the on-the-job training 
required to perform even the most menial of functions.  The sectors in which the employed 
find work are not identified.  No indication is given of the relative training status (either or 
both formal and on-the-job) of the employed as opposed to the unemployed.  No reference is 
made to any apparently anomalous outcomes like less well-trained individuals (less skilled?) 
                                                 
42 This is an odd way to describe what is supposed to have taken place. 
43 Desperation on the part of the compiler of the research findings in the Five Year Report is evident in the 
summing up and recommendations, one of which reads as follows: “Furthermore, it seemed that not all 
beneficiaries received training, or that on-the-job training seemed insufficient.  It was recommended that some 
of the training modules or programmes should be mandatory in order to improve the skills of beneficiaries to be 
more employable and well-positioned to start their own businesses.” (DPW, 2009b, p.71)  It does not seem as 
though not all beneficiaries received training – more than two thirds of them did not.   21
obtaining employment ahead of their better trained counterparts.  By the time sample 
respondents had been partitioned into those still employed by the EPWP and those not, and 
the latter group partitioned into those who were employed and those not, only 93 of the 
former, and 252 of the latter remained.  The Five Year Report does not say it, but this is 
probably too small a number on the basis of which to say much of statistical significance.  
What it does say is that: 
 
“The findings outlined in this report represented certain quantifiable changes and impacts 
on beneficiaries’ lives, such as improved levels of training and skills development, 
fluctuating (sic) levels of income, and increased opportunities.  However, the long-term 
effect of the EPWP and its secondary benefits, i.e. training and skills transfer, will only be 
truly assessable in the many years ahead as beneficiaries embark on the slow process of 
integration into the mainstream economy.” (DPW, 2009b, p.71) 
 
It may well be that the more detailed research report from which the findings in the Five Year 
Report are extracted, disclose ‘improved levels of training and skills development’ – the Five 
Year Report does nothing of the kind.  In short, after what must have been the expenditure of 
a significant sum of money (longitudinal surveys are not cheap) the general public is no 
wiser.   
 
To bring this section to a close, it is perhaps worthwhile, as a caution, to cite the findings 
from the Betcherman et al (2004) survey.  After an exhaustive examination of almost 200 
evaluations of active labour market policies, these authors reported that as far as training for 
the unemployed is concerned: 
 
“Participants often benefit from these programs in terms of higher employment rates, but 
not in terms of higher earnings.  The few evaluations in developing countries paint a less 
favorable picture.  Programs seem to work best with on-the-job training and active 
employer involvement.  Results are more positive for women than for men.” (2004, p.ii) 
 
As far as the EPWP is concerned, all that can be hoped for is that developing country 
experience turns out to be very different from that in much-developed economies. 
 
How useful is (was) the LFS as a tool for M&E? 
 
One of the tools that formed part the EPWP M&E package was the (then) bi-annual Labour 
Force Survey (LFS).  The hopes expressed by the EPWP for the LFS are expressed thus in 
the Five Year Report: 
 
“Assuming that approximately 800 000 people would work on the EPWP at some point 
during the initial five-year period of the programme, it could be expected that 1 800 
participants would be included in the LFS sample.  This was deemed a sufficiently large 
sample to permit an analysis of the impact of the EPWP on employability, as well as to 
provide information about the household income and structure of beneficiaries.  An in-
depth analysis of the programmes would not be possible through the LFS, but it would 
provide a high-level, macro-impact analysis.” (DWP, 2009b, p.61) 
 
Looking back at the proposed framework, whose compilers began their discussion of the 
survey tools to be used with an examination of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) (DPW, 2005a,   22
Section 4.1.1, pp.21ff), it may be seen that the paragraph from the Five Year Report cited 
above, was lifted almost verbatim from the 2005 document.  Here is the paragraph and the 
one that follows it: 
 
“[The LFS has] a sufficiently large sample to permit analysis of the impact of the EPWP 
on employability, as well as to provide information about the household income and 
structure of beneficiaries.  It should be noted that deep analysis of the programmes will 
not be possible through the LFS, as the survey is not geared to that purpose.  It will enable 
high level, macro-impact analysis. 
 
Not only will the inclusion of employment on EPWP projects in the LFS enable users of 
this data to clearly identify this category of employment, thereby preventing distortions of 
time series data, it will also be a cheap method of collecting information about the 
beneficiaries of EPWP projects and their households.  Ultimately, once the scope and 
coverage of data collected in this way is assessed, it may be possible to reduce the scope 
of the other evaluation techniques, or even replace them with data from the LFS.” (DPW, 
2005a, p.21) 
 
In principle, there is nothing wrong with reproducing an aspirational statement, especially if 
the promise held out, is fulfilled.  When, however, things do not work out as planned, a little 
reflection would not go amiss – if the LFS information extracted and published so far is any 
guide, then its potential has been grossly over-estimated. 
 
Designing survey questions is, as anyone who has ever been required to do, is no simple 
matter.  When it is unclear what the precise meaning is of a concept on which information is 
sought, it becomes nightmarishly difficult.  ‘Employability’, I would suggest, is just such a 
concept.  Whether anything useful about it can be gleaned from a few questions in a survey 
such as the LFS, is moot.
44  Critical scrutiny about the proposed uses of the LFS could thus 
do worse than to commence with a examination of the ‘deep analysis’ question.  One could, 
for example, ask why, when looking at the survey questions and the responses they have 
elicited, if ‘deep analysis’ is not possible, the questions in the LFS were designed in such a 
way as to look as though they could yield the kind of information required for ‘deep analysis’ 
of certain aspects of the programme, or if not ‘deep analysis’, then certainly micro-analysis? 
 
Without talking to those concerned, this question is not readily answered – beyond the trivial 
results presented in the Five Year Report (on which, more later) it is not known what the 
EPWP management and its analysts have made of the data currently available.  If we want to 
know what contribution the LFS data sets could make to an analysis of the performance of 
the programme, it is going to be necessary to do a little digging. 
 
Collection of data on the EPWP commenced in the March 2005 LFS.  The questionnaire was 
revised for the September 2005 LFS (questions increased in number from three to eight), and 
data were duly collected in five successive rounds of the survey (September 2005-September 
2007).  Table 2 below reproduces six of the eight EPWP questions in the LFS.
45 
 
                                                 
44 The definition of what constituted EPWP work, and the reporting of ‘work opportunities’ were both so sloppy 
as to render the survey results more than a little suspicious. 
45 Question 5.1 wanted to know if people had ever heard of the EPWP, and Question 5.5 asked for provincial 
locations of EPWP job opportunities.  Questionnaires are available from a number of sites.  One of the best one 
is the DataFirst site in the University of Cape Town – much less user-friendly is the Statistics South Africa site.   23
Why it was felt to be necessary to ask both questions 5.2 and 5.3 is not clear.  One’s intuition, 
since the EPWP is a ‘government job creation programme’, is that question 5.3 would call 
forth more respondents than question 5.2.  From the table it transpires that this is not what 
happens – why, is not easy to fathom.  What one does find is that the sum of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
responses in each category in questions 5.6 and 5.8 is 505, while the sum of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
responses in questions 5.7 is 508, roughly the number who respond with a ‘Yes’ to question 
5.3. 
 
The sum of the folk who could identify the project or programme they worked on (question 
5.4) is a bit lower – the coding instructions for the handwritten responses collected by 
interviewer are to ‘use EPWP codes’ (Named EPWP project).  Most participants chose 
‘Other’.  Question 5.4 looks like a waste of everyone’s time – it identifies only three 
programmes or projects where the number involved (population-weighted response total) was 
greater than 10 000, the cut-off point below which sample number is too small to provide 
reliable estimates. 
 
Question 5.6 on skills is also a waste of time, energy and money, despite throwing up some 
quite big numbers (like the 85 000 EPWP participants who acquired skills in construction-
related programmes).  Apart from the fact that skill levels are notoriously difficult to 
measure, the trivial lengths of the average training periods disclosed in the analysis further 
below, especially in construction, could mean little more than, say, a worker has been taught 
to mix concrete. 
 
The interesting information in the survey is that gathered in response to questions 5.7 and 5.8.  
Since the sum of participants who claim to have obtained work, either temporary or 
permanent, or to have started a business, exceeds by a long way, the number who are not still 
working in the programme (175 000 vs. 102 000), one must assume that those still on it are 
included amongst those who have obtained employment or started a business.
46  This result, if 
correct, is the news that the EPWP ought to be bragging about – if this performance were 
repeated in the following half year, then about 40 000 permanent jobs will have been created, 
and roughly the same number of businesses started.  Certainly, the achievement is way over 
the target level of the 14 per cent it was hoped would be able to earn income after 
participating in the programme (DPW, 2005a, p.v).
47 
 
A cursory search of cyberspace did not reveal any trace of the pointed boasting of the sort 
one would to find if it had been discovered (via the LFSs) that the EPWP was generating jobs 
or businesses at a scale large enough to affect unemployment levels.  Speculation about this 
does not get one very far – one could, for example, suppose that the EPWP management had 
not yet analysed the LFS data when it came to writing the Five Year Report. 
 
 
                                                 
46 This is easy to check – all it requires is that one dips into the data set available from Statistics South Africa.  
The answer, although is not relevant for our purposes here, may have something to do with fact that almost 
90 000 of the jobs obtained were of a temporary nature. 
47 The success rate in obtaining employment or starting a business is also considerably higher than that reported 
in the studies examined by McCord (2009, pp.257ff).   24
Table 2  Responses to EPWP questions in LFS 12 (September 2005) 
 N  Nw 
Q5.2  Has …… participated in any EPWP programme or project during 
the past six (6) months?  712  273 839
Q5.3  Did ……. work in any government job creation programme or 
project during the past six (6) months?  529  208 193
Q5.4   What is the name of the programme or project that ……. 
Worked/participated in during the past six (6) months?     
Named EPWP project  222  90 220
Other 258  96  955
Q5.6  Which of the following skills (if any) did ………. acquire during 
participation in any of the programmes or project mentioned in Q5.4?     
Variable Q56aCons : Construction related   232  85 653
Variable Q56bHome : Home based care   43  19 865
Variable Q56cChil : Early childhood development   16  13 513
Variable Q56dFore : Forestry   31  10 552
Variable Q56eAgri : Agriculture and animal husbandry   71  19 353
Variable Q56fNume : Numeracy /literacy   8  2 518
Variable Q56gHiva : HIV/AIDS awareness   45  23 237
Variable Q56hCare : Career awareness   38  19 750
Variable Q56iBusn : Business related   69  34 369
Variable Q56jOthr : Other skills   43  21 686
Q5.7  Is …… still working/participating in the programme or project?   
Yes 275 98  390
No 233 101  504
Q5.8  What, if any, were/are the benefits of participating in the 
programme or project mentioned in Q5.4?     
Variable Q58aSust : Got a permanent job   54  22 299
Variable Q58bStar : Started own business using skills and experience 
acquired   58  22 211
Variable Q58cFurt : Opportunity for further training   124  52 196
Variable Q58dTemp : Obtained temporary work   243  89 323
Variable Q58eOthr : Other benefits   27  11 183
Source: Responses to LFS 12, Downloaded from http://interactive.statssa.gov.za:8282/webview/, 
20
th April 2009. 
Note: N = number of responses (sample estimate), Nw = Population weighted estimate. 
Universe – All members of the households in selected dwelling units aged 15 years and above 
(73 847 respondents in total). 
 
 
Simply adding up the number of people who report in each round that they have participated 
in the EPWP tells us very little – what we need is work histories.  As a quasi-panel study (20 
per cent of households were ‘rotated’ out of the LFS sample at each round), the survey was, 
in principle, capable of tracking individuals from survey to survey for at least four rounds, 
thus making possible the building up of labour market participation profiles.  There are limits 
to what the survey could reveal – it cannot give durations for those who are only in an EPWP 
project for a short while, but it should register if someone appears in four successive rounds 
of the survey.  It should also be able to tell us a little about participants who obtain 
employment (or fail to do so).  The drawback, and it is no small matter, is that in order to 
perform longitudinal analysis using the data, respondent records have to be matched (linked 
from survey to survey).  Only Statistics South Africa is allowed to carry out this task.  Unless 
there has been a major change in recent times, it is unlikely that the official statistics producer   25
is anywhere near being up-to-date with this onerous task.  It is thus unlikely (although not 
impossible) that the EPWP has performed any analysis of that sort, in which case, we (and 
they?) are in the dark.  As a potential source of data for evaluating the performance of the 
EPWP, the Labour Force Surveys left more than a little to be desired. 
 
When the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFSs) was introduced in 2008, the General 
Household Survey (GHS), which had been asking questions in parallel with the LFSs since 
2004, became the sole source of information collected by Statistics South Africa on the 
EPWP.  In the 2008 GHS Questions 5.2 and 5.3 above were condensed into one, making it 
impossible to separate EPWP work opportunities from other government employment 
creation projects (if any?).  Questions 5.6 and 5.8 were retained,
48 while 5.4 and 5.7 were 
dropped.  Getting rid of the latter puts paid to the possibility of separating ‘proper’ jobs from 
‘temporary government-sponsored’ employment in the labour market.  Despite the fact that 
(a) EPWP work opportunities do not last much longer than 70-90 working days on average, 
and that (b) the periodicity of the GHS is 12 months, instead of the LFS’s six months (and the 
QLFS’s three months), the combined question on participation in an EPWP project or other 
government scheme still asks whether this has taken place in the past six months.  It is not 
clear why the shift has taken place – before it did, there was a chance, admittedly slender, of 
some longitudinal analysis being performed on the data.  That is now gone, damaging further, 
the already impaired ability to conduct “high-level, macro-impact analysis” on the basis of 
the questions asked in the surveys. 
 
Reference was made above to the trivial results from the LFS presented in the Five Year 
Report.  Opening with a statement about the usefulness of the LFS for understanding 
developments in the labour market, the Report informs us that: 
 
“Given the nature of the EPWP as a predominantly second economy intervention, the 
EPWP unit was keen to determine whether the programme had been heard of and 
understood.  Therefore, as part of the LFS questionnaire, sampled households were 
questioned as to whether they had ever heard of the EPWP.”
49 (DPW, 2009b, p.72) 
 
Three tables, covering the years 2005-2007 are then presented, showing numbers of and 
percentages of respondents, by province, answering Yes or No to the question (Tables 16-18).  
For the most part, year-on-year changes, especially at a national level, are small.  From the 
responses to the question, the Report’s compilers conclude that: 
 
“Overall, 30% of the households were aware of the EPWP and some had even 
participated in the programme.  No figures are available for the 2008/09 financial year, as 
the LFS is currently under review in order to align it with the Quarterly Progress 
Reports.” (DPW, 2009b, p.73) 
 
To be charitable, it may be argued that these results could be used to inform the EPWP’s 
publicity campaigns at both national and provincial level – the very fact that year-on-year 
changes are small, may, itself, be significant.  That, however, cannot possibly justify the 
profligate use of space entailed in presenting such uninteresting information (apart from the 
breathless ‘and some had even participated in the programme’).  Comparing this with the 
                                                 
48 These became question numbers 2.19; 2.20 and 2.21 in the 2008 GHS.  In the 2009 GHS, the number of 
questions was reduced to one only (Question 1.46) – “Has …. Participated in a Government or municipal job 
creation programme or expanded public works programme in the last six months?”  
49 This was question 5.1 in the LFSs up to September 2007.   26
paucity of information culled from the longitudinal survey, one can but wonder at the motives 
of the Report’s compilers. 
 
On that unhappy note, let us take leave of Phase 1 of the EPWP, to look at aspects of the 
recently announced Phase 2. 
 
3. Phase 2 of the EPWP: What is on offer? 
 
By any standard one cares to adopt, EPWP Phase 2 is an ambitious undertaking.  Even after 
the ‘work opportunities’
50 have been converted to full-time equivalents (FTEs), the numbers 
are still large.  Before the launch in April 2009, fairly detailed estimates of the numbers of 
work opportunities, and sums of money involved, were available.  A Department of Public 
Works (DPW) presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Public Works in 
February 2009, for example, offers a breakdown of the numbers of work opportunities (and 
FTEs) by sphere of government, for each year of the programme.
51  Estimates differ slightly 
from source to source, but the differences are not significant. 
 
Table 3 below has been constructed on the basis of the estimates published the EPWP Five 
Year Report.  This contains numbers of ‘work opportunities’ and the number of full-time 
equivalent jobs (FTEs) that they represent, for each year of Phase 2 of the programme (DPW, 
2009b, p.139).  Also provided, are estimates of the distribution of ‘work opportunities’ (and 
FTEs) by sector for the 2009-2014 period (DPW, 2009b, p.141).  The figures from the Five 
Year Report are highlighted in bold font – they appear in the first two panels of the table.  
Below that in the third and fourth panels, are the results of an attempt to estimate the annual 
numbers of work opportunities in the Infrastructural and Environmental sectors that may 
become available. 
 
The estimates in panels 3 and 4 have been produced using the assumption that the 
proportional distribution of opportunities between sectors shown in the first panel, holds good 
for the whole of the five year period.  This may not have been the way the projections were 
constructed, but as may be seen, the total numbers of work opportunities over the five-year 
period generated in this way are similar to the totals given in the first panel.  For our purposes 
here, they are therefore, good enough. 
 
In the last two columns of the table, estimates of the mean durations of job opportunities, and 
mean training durations if the code of good practice – 2 days for every 22 days worked – 
(DoL, 2002 ) is followed, are presented.  In the first panel, a row that sums Infrastructural and 
Environmental job opportunities has also been added.  The bulk of the work opportunities (72 
per cent) and full-time equivalents (FTEs – 62 per cent) are concentrated in the Infrastructure 
and Environmental sectors.  Should the programme deliver what these figures suggest, then 
employment duration in the former will average about 87 days, and in the latter, 70 days.  If 
                                                 
50 The exact origin of the figures is not known.  Slides 7 and 8 in DWP, 2008, the first being a table giving 
estimates of the numbers of EPWP ‘job opportunities’ required to reach the employment halving goal by 2014 
under three different growth scenarios, do, however, give an indication of the likely source of the aggregate 
totals, possibly in the work of Miriam Altman. 
51 Details of the proceedings are available on the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website.  The February 2009 
briefing of the Portfolio Committee by the Minister of Public Works may be downloaded at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20090211-phase-2-expanded-public-works-programme-briefing.   27
the recommendation on training is to be met, its duration, on average, would be eight days in 













Infrastructure  2 374 000  900 000 87 8 
Environmental  1 156 000  350 000 70 6 
Sub-Total: Infrastructure + Environmental 
 
 
3 530 000  1 250 000 81 7 
Social  750 000  500 000 153 14 
Non-state  640 000  280 000  101 9 
Total (approx)  4 920 000  2 030 000 95 9 
Yearly targets: Total 
Year 1  500 000  210 000 97 9 
Year 2  600 000  260 000 100 9 
Year 3  850 000  360 000 97 9 
Year 4  1 200 000  500 000 96 9 
Year 5  1 500 000  680 000 104 9 
Total (approx)  4 650 000  2 010 000 99 9 
Yearly targets: Infrastructural 
Year 1  241 000  93 000 89 8 
Year 2  290 000  115 000 92 8 
Year 3  410 000  160 000 90 8 
Year 4  579 000  222 000 88 8 
Year 5  724 000  301 000 96 9 
Total (approx)  2 244 000  891 000 91 8 
Yearly targets: Environmental 
Year 1  117 000  36 000 71 6 
Year 2  141 000  45 000 73 7 
Year 3  200 000  62 000 71 6 
Year 4  282 000  86 000 70 6 
Year 5  352 000  117 000 77 7 
Total (approx)  1 093 000  347 000 73 7 
 
 
As has been pointed out above, there is little evidence to show that training periods of short 
duration, offered to people performing mainly routine tasks, have much impact on 
employability (DPW, 2004; McCord, 2007a).  Since training was a major failure in Phase 1, 
one imagines that when detailed information on Phase 2 is released, a clear statement of 
intent about training will be made.  In the absence of guidelines and directives, it is likely that 
training will be neglected by many authorities. 
 
Hints that the emphasis on training in certain EPWP sectors (recall from above that training 
was proclaimed to be a ‘central objective’ of the programme), has softened are present in a 
                                                 
52 Estimates of the number of FTEs into which the work opportunities listed in Table 3 translate, differ from 
those given in the national expenditure estimates (National Treasury, 2010b, p.12).  The differences are minor.   28
couple of EPWP documents.  One of them, an early draft of the Business Plan for Phase 2 of 
the programme (DPW, 2009d), contains the following statement: 
 
“One of the amendments in the second phase of the programme is to increase the focus on 
the creation of temporary work opportunities that provide income to the poor unemployed 
and the primary outputs of the programme have been defined only in these terms.  The 
sectors and their individual programmes will, where appropriate define the training, exit 
strategy and SMME development outputs which will vary considerable from sector to 
sector.” (DPW, 2009d, p.10) 
 
One way of reading this is that in Phase 2, instead of having to conform to nationally 
specified training minima, “individual programmes” will be free to define what constitutes 
appropriate training.  This is preceded by a statement to the effect that: 
 
“It was … noted that the training framework for the second phase of the programme 
would have to be improved as the training targets in the first phase were not being met 
because of, among other reasons, limited existing training capacity to implement the 
massive training requirement of the programme.” (p.5) 
 
An earlier document, Slide 11 in the presentation of the ‘Overview of EPWP Phase 2’ given 
at the Second Economy Strategy workshop on 29
th September 2008 (DPW, 2008), 
distinguishes between ‘Longer Term Public Employment Programmes’ which aims to 
provide ‘Longer Term Training’ for medium/high skills jobs, ‘Project Based Public Work 
Programmes’ which provide ‘Training as and when required’, at medium/low skills, to Non-
state and Community Programmes where ‘Training as and when required’ can cater for the 
skills needs of those who perform the manual labour on these programmes (DWP, 2008, 
Slide 11). 
 
Appearing in one of its many guises (in this case as a sub-text to the discussion above), is a 
question that lies at the heart of economics, namely, that of how to distribute a scarce 
resource, especially when there is a possibility that the resource may have to be rationed.  
Cold economic calculus insists that resources be distributed so as to maximise welfare.  If the 
purpose of training is equip the largest possible number with the skills necessary to obtain 
employment, and if capacity to absorb training is unequally distributed, and if training has to 
be rationed, then a search for those most likely to succeed, is indicated.
53  Of course, in the 
EPWP this may already be happening to some extent, especially in the Social sector.   
Although there is probably a fair amount of self-selection (as opposed to vetting) involved, 
the more able, however defined, may possibly be selected for the host of ancillary jobs (those 
requiring more than elementary skills).  What determined which low-skilled participants 
received training in Phase 1 is not known (neither is the quality known of the training 
received by those lucky enough to get it). 
 
                                                 
53 Of course, other maximands may be specified: it may, for example, an equal division of the scarce resource 
among all participants, regardless of be demanded (an equity vs. efficiency problem).  There is, it could be 
argued, a good case for abandoning the attempt to provide formal training (along the lines spelled out above) in 
the Infrastructure and Environmental sectors – in these sectors, most workers could get by with only the on-the-
job training required to enable them to carry out the elementary tasks they are employed to do.  If the ethical 
problems involved in concentrating resources on a minority (favouring them) could be overcome, consideration 
could be given to the provision of more extensive training to a select group who are likely to profit by it.   29
As may be seen in Table 2 above, nearly three-and-a-half million unemployed folk are 
scheduled to participate in relatively low-skilled jobs in the Infrastructure and Environment 
sectors.  Finding those among them most likely to succeed in obtaining employment would 
have been difficult even if the Phase 1 monitoring and evaluation exercise had provided some 
guidance.  If the findings in the Five Year Report are anything to go by, however, the M&E 
effort has little, if anything to offer.  The dual question of the quantity and quality of training 
available, and the selection of recipients of such training, ought to be the subject of a major 




Next up for consideration are the estimates of the numbers of work opportunities to be 
created.  If the figures in the second panel of Table 3 are plotted on a graph, the outcome that 
the experience of Phase 1 was simply extrapolated into the future, with relatively slow 
growth between year 1 and year 2 giving way to faster growth in succeeding years.  This 
raises the suspicion that a goodly measure of thumb-sucking has taken place.  It is possible 
that this is not the case, but if that is so, it would be interesting to know something about the 
basis on which the estimates have been made.  The possibility that the figures are helped 
along by guesswork is heightened by the fact that using an assumption of roughly equi-
proportional growth in the Infrastructure and Environmental sectors yields estimates of total 
growth that are similar to the totals given in the Five Year Report. 
 
To claim that figures for a project stretching well into the medium-term contain some element 
of guesswork can surely occasion no surprise – everybody knows that forecasting is difficult.  
What is of interest here is thus not the question of how much guesswork there is in the EPWP 
calculations, but rather, what likelihood there is of outcomes in 2014 anything like those 
depicted in Table 3, coming to pass.  Two imponderables bar the route to (relative) certainty 
in this matter, both of which we have already met.  The first is technical (i.e., it is concerned 
with production functions), the second, institutional-political.  The two are intertwined. 
 
Our cue comes from the performance figures given in the EPWP Phase 1 Five Year Report 
and reproduced in Table 1 above.  It may be recalled that with the exception of Infrastructure 
and Social work opportunities, and Infrastructure person-years of work, few of the 
‘achieveds’ was anywhere near the ‘targets’.  As has been shown above, EPWP management 
has long been aware of the problem of poor data capture, and the difficulties of distinguishing 
EPWP from non-EPWP projects.  In short, there are reasons to doubt the performance 
figures, especially those for Infrastructure. 
 
The requirement for Phase 2 of the EPWP is twofold; one is to make the data more reliable, 
the other is to reduce the ‘distances’ between ‘target’ and ‘achieved’.  The question is: how?  
From the EPWP Five Year Report, and from the various briefings and presentations referred 
to above, it is clear that a great deal of soul-searching, sector by sector, has gone into trying 
to work out what went wrong.  It is not the intention here to examine those analyses – my 
interest is in the most significant measure adopted in Phase 2 to push performance closer to 
plan, namely, the performance-related incentive payments that have been introduced.  Before 
looking at those payments, it may be useful to spend a few moments looking at the branch of 
economics concerned with the substitutability of factors of production.  Doing so enables one 
to make some broad predictions about the areas where problems may be expected. 
                                                 
54 It could be argued, as Debbie Budlender has done (pers. comm. 31 January 2011) that ‘finding those most 
likely to succeed’ is too ‘economistic’ for a programme like the EPWP.  She argues that it is neither 
economically (beyond the capacity of the state) nor politically feasible.   30
 
Conventional economics is fond of teasing students with diagrams depicting lovely smooth 
isoquants, along which the factors of production, capital and labour, may be substituted until 
an equilibrium, determined by relative factor prices, is reached.  The discipline is not so silly 
as to fail to recognise that fixed factor proportions are at least a possibility, so a decidedly 
prickly looking isoquant, with a corner solution to the allocation question, may be found 
lurking in some texts. 
 
Surprising though it may seem to some that such abstract considerations have any relevance 
to the EPWP, it is the problems of allocation highlighted by this simple model, that are at the 
heart of the difficulties of those trying to predict future outcomes of the programme.  A 
leitmotif of the EPWP, the need to increase labour intensity of production, relies for its 
applicability precisely on the extent to which labour may be substituted for capital.  This 
approach opens the way to a rigorous understanding of the possibilities of the programme.  
This may be illustrated by reference to a few EPWP projects – take early childhood 
development (ECD), for example, in the Social sector.  If this is to be provided by way of 
nursery schools or kindergardens (now referred to by the politically correct term ‘ECD 
Centres’), then factor proportions are relatively fixed – a suitable building, and qualified staff 
required.  No more than a certain number of children can safely be admitted, and there are 
norms for the ratios of children to staff.  Equipment may be more or less elaborate, as may 
the building itself, but that is all that can be varied.  Community care, by contrast, requires 
trivial capital outlays, relying almost entirely on trained staff.  Administrative capacities will 
probably have to be strengthened as numbers of carers increase, but this is likely to occur in 
stepwise fashion, rather than in any close relationship to the size of the carer workforce.  
Clearly, in both cases, talk of increasing labour intensity would be inappropriate – this 
explains why the goal of the social sector of the EPWP is to expand provision and not to 
make existing production more labour intensive.  Investigation of why the sector had not 
come up to scratch in terms of meeting employment targets would focus not on labour 
intensity, but rather on budgetary allocation processes – either these activities are given 
priority or they are not. 
 
Infrastructure, by contrast, especially road-building, offers scope for a wide variety of 
production techniques.  Minor roads can be constructed almost entirely by hand using the 
simplest tools.  That includes the classic prison-labour task of producing the equivalent of 
crusher run, using hand-held hammers, as well as excavation by pick and shovel.  When 
choice of technique widens, uncertainty enters, and economics begins to stumble.  Moving 
out of a world of workers with known productivities and market-determined wages into one 
in which neither condition holds, the temptation to stick to tried and trusted capital-intensive 
techniques is strong, particularly when management is dominated by engineers.
55  T h e  
responsibility of delivering on time and within budget is a powerful disciplining force.  It 
does not require 20/20 hindsight to claim that inducing the awarders of contracts (provinces 
and municipalities) to increase the labour intensity of infrastructure projects was always 
going to be a difficult task.  The weaker the municipality, in terms of technical capacity, the 
less one would expect it to be able to confront capital-intensive bias.
56 
 
                                                 
55 According to the EPWP Five Year Report, labour intensity in the Social sector was more than twice as high as 
it was in the Infrastructure sector.  See DWP, 2009b, Figure 19, p.113. 
56 Unfortunately, many examples of capital goods bias may be seen in the larger municipalities and metropoles 
as well.  The explanation is likely to be that offered above.   31
Although the Infrastructure work opportunity and person-years of work targets were both 
allegedly met in Phase 1 of the EPWP, with the largest contribution to the total coming from 
the municipalities (see DPW, 2009b, Table 29, p.112), there have been indications over the 
years that the goal of increasing labour intensity is not viewed with great enthusiasm.  The 
2007 briefing referred to above noted that: 
 
“… contribution from the municipalities was lacking… ” (DPW, 2007) 
 
The 2008 overview, as we have seen above, commented that: 
 
“Use of labour-intensive methods remains contentious and seen as high risk” 
 
and that there are: 
 
“No incentives for public bodies to increase labour-intensity significantly… ” (DPW, 
2008) (emphasis in original) 
 
The 2009 Ministerial and departmental briefing pointed out that: 
 
“Both Provincial and Municipal entities needed to be reminded that the projects were 
intended to be labour-intensive.” (DPW, 2009e) 
 
The Five Year Report commented that: 
 
“During EPWP Phase One, municipalities did not significantly adopt labour-intensive 
approaches to infrastructure implementation.”  (Presidency, 2009b, p.57) 
 
Despite being in its sixth year, the programme’s managers said in the PowerPoint 
presentation in August 2010 that: 
 
“Labour-intensity of projects implemented not being optimized by Provincial 
Departments and Municipalities.” (DPW, 2010) 
 
Facing the EPWP as it enters Phase 2 is a large array of challenges, to which a wide variety 
of responses has been devised.  Increasing labour intensity, if not the most difficult of these to 
overcome, is certainly the challenge which has attracted the largest budgetary allocation – 
performance-related incentive payments referred to fleetingly above.  The remainder of this 
section is devoted the presentation of a few of the details of the incentive scheme. 
 
EPWP watchers would have been able to pick up an early warning about impending changes 
in the about-to-be-launched Phase 2 of the programme, in the “Overview of Phase 2” that 
appeared on the TIPS website (referred to as DPW, 2008).  That presentation informed its 
audience that: 
 
“On 25 June 2008 Cabinet approved the continuation of the EPWP for a second period of five 
years and the broad proposals for scaling up the programme further. 
 
  These proposals contained two new elements: an incentive/ performance based 
allocation for the EPWP to drive the further expansion of existing government   32
implemented programmes and the expansion of the EPWP into non-State as well as 
increasing regular predictable employment programmes (100 days)” 
 
In essence, the incentive scheme is simplicity itself – if the authority responsible for 
implementing an EPWP project meets an agreed target for the creation of work opportunities, 
it qualifies for an incentive payment.  As ever, the devil lies in the detail.  Obviously, care in 
the design of the proposed incentives is necessary to prevent them from sliding into 
municipal coffers and being diverted to other purposes. 
 
To qualify for the proposed incentive – (at the time) an amount of R50 per person-day of 
work created – eligible municipalities will have to meet (or exceed) formal targets for work 
opportunity creation.  The intention is to stimulate enthusiasm in municipalities, which have 
much of the responsibility for the implementation of the EPWP, for the programme’s original 
aim of increasing labour intensity.  The proceeds are to be spent by municipalities on 
increasing the number of work opportunities beyond those specified in the agreed targets – 
that, it is hoped, will provide a boost that will help to achieve the massive increase in the 
EPWP employment numbers listed in Table 3.
57 
 
The sums of money involved are large – the AsgiSA annual report for 2007/2008 (published 
in mid-April 2009), reported that: 
 
“From 2009 to 2012, R4.2 billion has been allocated to Phase Two of the EPWP. This 
will include a new EPWP grant incentive for municipalities aimed at providing them with 
incentives to increase the number of employment opportunities on infrastructure projects.  
During EPWP Phase One, municipalities did not significantly adopt labour-intensive 
approaches to infrastructure implementation. 
 
The extension of this programme targets 400 000 full-time equivalent longer-term jobs in 
the social and municipal services sectors, home-based and community care, as well as 
project-based employment in infrastructure and environmental protection, in adult literacy 
initiatives and in programmes delivered through non-governmental organisations.”  
(Presidency, 2009b, p.57) 
 
In Phase 1 of the EPWP, little direct funding was made through the Department of Public 
Works (DPW), the department with overall responsibility for the programme.  In the financial 
year 2009/2010 for example, in a budget of R5.7 billion, more was allocated to 
administration (R690 million) than to the EPWP (R510 billion).  Such funding as there was 
went instead through other departments, and other jurisdictions, e.g., municipalities.  With the 
introduction of the incentive scheme, this changes dramatically.  In 2010/2011, the DPW 
expenditure allocation to the EPWP increases (to R1.5 billion).  It reaches a projected R2.5 
billion 2012/2013 (National Treasury, 2010c, p.90).
58 
 
                                                 
57 Early indications that the incentives may work, are favourable.  See the article “New grant boosts EPWP 
project” by Samantha Enslin-Payne in IOL (Independent online) Business Report, October 14, 2010. 
58 Over the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) period 2009-2012, the expenditure estimates in the 
2009 Budget for the National Public Works Programme, have amounts of R353 million in 2009/10, R954 
million in 2010/2011, and R1.9 billion in 2011/12 set aside for ‘Transfers and subsidies to Provinces and 
municipalities’.  About R730 million over the period 2009/12 will also be transferred to ‘non-profit institutions’ 
(National Treasury, 2009, Table 5.6, p.13).  Note that the expenditure downloads of the expenditure estimates 
on the Treasury website are all in small files.  The page number given here will thus not be the same as the page 
number in the paper publication.   33
The EPWP is an awfully large project for any government to tackle.  Consider, for example, 
the range of bodies through which incentives have to be distributed.  According to the August 
2010 incentive update: 
 
  “The Infrastructure sector incentive is applicable to Provincial Departments and 
Municipalities. 
  The Environmental sector incentive is applicable to National Departments through 
their appropriations from National Treasury. 
  The Non-state sector grant is paid to Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and 
Non-Profit Organisations [NPOs] through the Independent Development Trust (IDT) 
which was appointed as the intermediary.  
  The Social sector grant has been paid as a schedule 5 grant to Provincial Departments 
of Social Development and Education.” (DPW, 2010) 
 
To require bodies that malfunction much of the time, bodies which earn qualified audits year 
after year, to improve performance to the point where they can qualify for the payments, is to 
ask a great deal.  Even with the help of the additional data capturers hired through the EPWP 
(90 of them) and the engineers at head office available to advise and assist, it is not clear how 
the transition is to be achieved.  There is, however, as we shall see immediately below, an 
escape hatch from the condition that no payment is supposed to be made in the event of non-
compliance. 
 
It is contained in this long extract from a speech made in September 2009, in the Eastern 
Cape to award incentive cheques.  The incentive is supposed to function as a reward for 
meeting a target.  What the passage below suggests is that for many of the institutions or 
authorities concerned, where, for whatever reason, the parties are unable to agree on a target, 
the target is set to zero, and the incentive is paid, on what basis it is not specified.  Zero-
thresholds (targets) appear to apply mainly in municipalities likely to lack capacity.  Here is 
the passage: 
 
“Report monthly on the EPWP MIS [management information] system 
 
After the public body has submitted the EPWP quarter report an audit will be done and the 
money will then be transferred to the public body’s account by treasury if it has met the 
threshold. 
 
The EPWP incentive grant can only be used for job creation programmes, nothing else.  
Public bodies are compelled to sign the wage incentive agreement, committing themselves in 
implementing EPWP and achieving the targets as set.  All eligible public bodies within the 
province have signed except for Ingquza Hill Municipality. 
 
Program Director tonight we are here to award these ceremonial cheques to the public 
bodies that are eligible for the EPWP incentive grant as a symbol of commitment in 
accelerating and taking the fight against poverty and unemployment to greater heights.  Our 
province is greatly affected by the current global recession, mines are closing down forcing 
the mine workers to migrate back home as unemployed people.  The automobile sector that 
we have heavily relied on is seriously affected resulting in high retrenchments and other   34
companies closing down.  Note how many ‘zero thresholds there are among the public bodies 
eligible for the EPWP incentive grants:….”
 59 
 
The list of zero thresholds is indeed noteworthy: of five provincial government departments, 
one that has a positive threshold, the Department of Roads and Transport receives more than 
90 per cent of the funds disbursed (R29.9 million).  The other department that has a positive 
threshold, Health, receives 3.7 per cent of the sum handed out.  The other three departments 
have zero thresholds.  Among 12 municipalities to receive cheques, only two, Nelson 
Mandela Metro and Buffalo City had thresholds.  They each received about R333 000.  The 
remaining R26 million was distributed among ten municipalities, four of them taking 83 per 
cent of the disbursements to zero threshold recipients.  The reason for reproducing the 
numbers above is to draw attention to the relative amounts allocated to departments and 
municipalities that have no targets or thresholds, as opposed to those that have.  Without 
knowing what period the funds cover, or how the allocations were decided, it is it difficult to 
comment on the figures.  If, however, the figures above represent the future of what the 
distribution of payments may be like in some provinces,
60 then there are problems ahead.  
The threshold is supposed to function as a gateway to the incentive pot – if the zero threshold 
criterion causes that to fall away, what, one wonders, will the effects be on the programme?  
Will the monitoring structures be able to cope with poor record-keeping? 
 
Some portfolio and review committees, aware of their power, exercise it in ways that are 
acutely discomforting for the minister, the deputy ministers and senior civil servants alike.  
Scanning the minutes of the meetings (reviews, reports-back, briefings) referred to above, at 
which the EPWP has explained what it does, and why, does not give one with the sense that 
the members often ask questions that put the EPWP team on the spot.  One can only hope that 
the monitoring and evaluation systems for Phase 2 are not as ineffectual as those for Phase 1 
give the impression of being. 
 
4. What effect will Phase 2 have on unemployment? 
 
Government’s boast that unemployment will be halved by 2014 has attracted surprisingly 
little critical attention.  Apart from Miriam Altman of the HSRC, mine seems the only mind 
to have been sufficiently exercised by the ‘halving’ boast to want to challenge it.
61  Several 
papers, the first of them (Meth, 2004) published not long after the ‘halving’ goal was 
announced, have followed.  The most recent of them (Meth, 2009) argued once more that 
barring some miracle, neither the unemployment halving goal, nor its companion, the 
commitment to halve poverty by 2014, would be achieved.  To the best of my knowledge, no-
one in government has ever responded to these claims.  Great was my surprise, therefore, 
when I stumbled across the scenarios prepared by the National Treasury, on the basis of 
which it is concluded that: 
 
                                                 
59 The speech is headed “Eastern Cape MEC for Roads and Public Works Pemmy Majodina presenting 
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) incentive grant cheques”.  Dated 30 September 2009, it was 
downloaded on 22
nd August 2010 from: 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=6040&tid=6185. 
60 Provinces are likely to differ significantly in the proportion of funds going to zero threshold municipalities. 
61 See, for example Altman, 2009.  In that paper, she attempts to update an earlier set of employment forecasts 
to take account of the global economic crisis.   35
“The moderate recovery outlined in the budget forecast is projected to create just over 1 
million jobs in the next five years, and would result in only a marginal decline in the 
number of unemployed and the unemployment rate by 2014.” (National Treasury, 2010a, 
p.46) 
 
In the general melee of the 2010 Budget, the Treasury speculations have been almost entirely 
overlooked.  Yet they are of great significance, contradicting, as they do, the official line on 
unemployment, trotted out repeatedly by high-ranking ANC politicians and civil servants.
62  
Given their official provenance, the Treasury scenarios offer an obvious base on the strength 
of which to construct a set of estimates of the possible contribution of Phase 2 of the EPWP 
to goal of halving unemployment. 
 
It is clear from the tone of the statement made by the Minister of Public Works upon 
announcing the inception of Phase 2 of the EPWP that there is an expectation that the 
programme will make a substantial contribution to government’s goal of halving 
unemployment by 2014.
63  Yet how substantial this may be, seems not to have been the topic 
of any serious analysis – the present paper tries to fill part of the resulting void.  In earlier 
versions of the present paper, I made use of my own estimates for performing this task – the 
publication of the Treasury figures opens the way to a somewhat different approach (and a 
refreshing change from regurgitating estimates, even if only in summary form, I have 
published elsewhere).  The Treasury scenarios are reproduced in Table 4 below.  They are 
used as the basis for a set of speculations on the possible impact of Phase 2 of the EPWP on 
unemployment. 
 
It is not clear whether or not the Treasury figures take into account the EPWP job creation 
effort.  For the purpose of the exercise conducted below, it is assumed that they have not.  As 
may be seen, even in the most optimistic of the scenarios, the unemployment rate does not 
fall below 20 per cent by 2014, a long way from the ‘halving’ goal’s 14 per cent – that is 
achieved only by the year 2019.  At most, the number of unemployed in 2014 falls by less 
than 300 000 (from its 2009 level of about 4.1 million). 
 
Apart from the growth rates specified in the first two columns of the table, the other 
assumptions Treasury used to generate the unemployment rates in the last two columns, are 
an employment elasticity of growth (percentage change in employment divided by percentage 
change in output growth) of 0.5; a participation rate of 55 per cent over the whole period, and 
a growth rate of one per cent per annum for the working-age population. 
 
Both the employment elasticity and the participation rate assumptions are a little suspect – in 
particular, the latter.  It is extremely unlikely that the rate will not respond quite rapidly to 
changing economic conditions, with significant implications for unemployment levels.
64  Our 
                                                 
62 A particularly craven example is that of the official responsible for the EPWP monitoring and evaluation in 
the DPW, who said (in the presence of his Minister) that: “… that Government had adopted targets to halve 
unemployment and poverty between 2004 and 2014, but this should be viewed as an interim target only, as the 
aim was to improve upon these figures.”  (DPW, 2009e) 
63 See the article “SA on track to halve unemployment by 2014” by Wendell Roelf, in the Mail & Guardian 
online, 6 April 2009. 
64 In my work, the participation rate was allowed to take up a wide range of values, to cover a variety of possible 
responses by the potentially economically active.  In that work, I allowed the employment elasticity to depend 
on guesstimated numbers of jobs created.  Assumed economic growth rates (from a variety of medium-term 
forecasts reported in the press) were then used to guess at employment elasticities.  These ranged from about 0.6 
to 1.2.  The latter outcome, implying falling national productivity, results from the combination of fast growth in   36
business here was not, however, to develop a critique of the Treasury model, rather it was to 
speculate a little, as has been done above, on what the figures suggest could happen in the 
future. 
 
Notionally, using a survey instrument such as the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 
with appropriately designed questions, two distinct sets of effects of the pursuit of the 
‘halving’ goal may potentially be distinguished: the first of these, the macro-picture 
generated by the survey results, is concerned with the more conventional estimates of 
unemployment, namely the rates and numbers of people unemployed; the second of these, the 
number of days that people spend classed as ‘officially unemployed’, opens the door to a 
micro-examination of the socio-economic impacts of the EPWP.  They are considered below 
in that order. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the economically active population in response to relatively rapid economic growth in the economy, with 
employment creation through the EPWP and the Community Work Programme (CWP) added to that associated 
with economic growth.  See Meth, 2009, pp.19ff.   37
 
 
Table 4  Employment scenarios, 2010-2019 





Change in unemployment 






















Scenario A  3.2  3.5 1085 1274 14 058 15 332  -122.7 -311.4 22.6 19.8
Scenario B  3.4  4.0 1147 1470 14 120 15 590  -184.9 -507.2 22.2 19.8
Scenario C  3.5  4.5 1189 1667 14 162 15 829  -226.5 -704.1 22.0 17.2
Scenario D  3.7  6.0 1251 2266 14 224 16 490  -288.9 -1303.1 21.7 13.8
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How much can EPWP Phase 2 reduce unemployment rates and levels? 
 
To produce the estimates, it is necessary first to replicate the Treasury figures.  Since they do not 
give the origins of the base data they used, a little guesswork has been necessary – I have used 
the working age population, employment and official unemployment figures from the QLFS for 
the fourth quarter of 2009 (Statistical release P0211, 9 February 2009, p.vi).  No divergence is 
larger than 20 000 or so (most are much smaller), well within the limits of experimental error for 
an exercise of this sort.  Clearly, since the Treasury has opted to allow the growth rates to 
increase monotonically in the narrow range of 3.2-3.7 per cent per annum, it is not necessary, 
when performing the calculations, to do so for the two intermediate values.  The estimates in 
Table 5 are therefore based on growth rates of 3.2 and 3.7 per cent per annum, respectively.  
Estimates of the numbers of FTEs – full-time equivalent ‘jobs’ – to be created by Phase 2 of the 
EPWP are available for the years 2009/10 to 2013/14.
65  The 2013/14 figure is 680 000 FTEs.  
The financial year ends at the end of March, so to o take the results up to the end of calendar year 
2014, it is assumed that a further 600 000 EPWP FTEs (not ‘work opportunities’) are created. 
 
In order to gauge the significance for the unemployed of Phase 2 of the EPWP, it is necessary to 
compare the outcomes in Tables 4 and 5.  If we assume that the Treasury model does not include 
the EPWP work opportunities (converted to FTEs?), then, under the most optimistic of the 
Treasury assumptions (Scenario D), the unemployment rate in 2014 would be about 18 per cent 
when the EPWP work opportunities are taken into account, as opposed to about 22 per cent when 
they are not.  Corresponding numbers of unemployed are 3.25 and about 3.85 million.
66  Phase 2 
of the EPWP causes the number of unemployed to fall by 900 000 or so, as opposed to the 
290 000 drop that occurs in its absence. 
 
To object that exercises of the sort that generate the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 are too 
mechanistic to allow much reliance to be placed in them, would not be entirely unreasonable.  
Certainly, the assumptions used by the Treasury are too constricting to allow for the wide range 
of possible outcomes of an uncertain future.  The significance of the Treasury scenarios lies not 
in the possibility of any of them being fulfilled, but rather in the fact that they constitute, a rare 
and little noted acknowledgement by a government department of the probability that the 
unemployment halving goal will not be achieved. 
 
Having taken this preliminary step, it is to be hoped that Treasury will in future put some effort 
into increasing the sophistication of their basic model to allow for the inclusion of other job-
creation efforts, such as the Community Work Programme (CWP), for which R1.5 billion has 
been allocated in the 2010 budget.
67  Until such time Treasury offers a set of scenarios built on 
assumptions that pay greater respect to the radical unknowability of the behaviour of some of the 
variables involved, especially the changes in the participation rate, I prefer the set of results 
presented in Meth (2009), if only because they pay greater respect to the uncertainty of what the 
future holds. 
                                                 
65 The figures were published in the EPWP Five Year Report.  See DPW, 2009b, p.139. 
66 The latter figure is not given in Table 4, it is taken from the spreadsheet used to generate the results. 
67 See Treasury (2010a, p.127).  On the same page, reference is made to R52 billion set aside for Phase 2 of the 
EPWP.  This must be an error – it should surely be R5.2 billion?   39
 
 

















2009/2010 210 12  974  4165 24.3 0 
2010/2011 260 13  455  3911 22.5 -254 
2011/2012 360 13  779  3760 21.4 -405 
2012/2013 500 14  147  3568 20.1 -597 
2013/2014 680 14  559  3333 18.6 -832 

















2009/2010 210 12  974  4165 24.3 0 
2010/2011 260 13  474  3891 22.4 -274 
2011/2012 360 13  818  3721 21.2 -444 
2012/2013 500 14  207  3507 19.8 -658 
2013/2014 680 14  641  3251 18.2 -914 
Rest of 2014  600 14 819  3251 18.0 -914 
 
 
How much can EPWP Phase 2 reduce unemployment person/days? 
 
Estimates of the potential contribution of the EPWP to the unemployment ‘halving’ goal have 
been considered above.  Despite the narrowness of the Treasury scenarios, they will still be used 
as the basis of an attempt to translate the estimates of potential impacts of Phase 2 of the EPWP 
on the severity of unemployment, as measured by proportional reductions of the anticipated total 
numbers of days of unemployment experienced by the workforce as a whole. 
 
One of the problems faced by would-be analysts of the EPWP is that of attempting to discover, 
from the publicly available material, what the labour market status was of those who are 
fortunate enough to obtain a work opportunity.
68  In the absence of such knowledge, the 
conservative (if dubious) assumption to use is that the opportunities are collared by the officially 
unemployed (this will have the maximum impact on the unemployment rate).  It is trivially 
obvious that the EPWP reduces the number of unemployed by reducing the number of days they 
spend being idle during the year.  Expressing the total number of EPWP work days as a 
percentage of the total number of days of ‘official’ unemployment experienced by the workforce 
as a whole, gives us the figures reproduced in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 below. 
 
                                                 
68 This could not be determined from LFS and GHS questions reviewed above – what one needs to see is the 
longitudinal surveys.   40
Because these figures ignore the distribution of work opportunities among the unemployed, they 
tell us little about the welfare effects of the Phase 2 programme.  A more nuanced understanding 
of these effects of can be gained by looking at the sectors into which prospective workers will be 
drafted.  In the 2010 national expenditure estimates the EPWP is supposed to create the 
following ‘jobs’ by March 2014: 
 
  2 374 000 work opportunities (904 000 FTEs) in the infrastructure sector 
  1 156 000 work opportunities (326 000 FTEs) in the environment sector 
  750 000 work opportunities (513 000 FTEs) in the social sector 




Simply dividing the number of FTEs by the number of ‘work opportunities’ shows that durations 
of ‘jobs’ in these sectors will be very short, providing neither income security for any great 
length of time, nor much opportunity for training, even of the most rudimentary kind.  As a 
matter of interest, mean durations of the work opportunities in the four sectors are 90; 51; 157 
and 100 days respectively.  This yields an overall (weighted) mean of about 92 days.
70  Measured 
purely in terms of projected duration of employment, the place to be, if one can get there, is the 
social sector.  On the face of it, the least desirable area is the environment sector, despite the 
social value of such projects as Working for Water.  The figures in Columns 5 and 6 tell us how 
much of the reduction in unemployment will be due to the contribution of the infrastructure and 
environment sectors, the sectors in which work opportunity duration is (nominally) shortest. 
 
In year 1, the percentage reduction in employment days is small but not insignificant.  By year 5, 
although fairly substantial, the EPWP does not even reduce the time that the officially 
unemployed spend out of work by one fifth.  As one would expect, the Infrastructure and 
Environmental sectors are responsible for most of the slight improvement observed. 
 
So much for the bald numbers – the socio-economic effect is more difficult to decode.  Let us 
approach the problem by spelling out two extreme scenarios.  In the first of these, we assume 
that each participant is only allowed one work opportunity, and that they are not offered another 
work opportunity until all other unemployed who wish to take up the EPWP opportunity have 
enjoyed at least one work opportunity.  In all, somewhere between 4.6 and 4.9 million people 
would be processed through the system in five years, enjoying on average some 92-95 days of 
work.  If we treat as eligible only those who are classified as officially unemployed, then 
somewhere after year 3 has commenced, depending on how fast the economy has grown, some 
of the unemployed will become eligible for a second spell of work.  If we include the 
discouraged unemployed, by the end of the five-year period there would still be some among 
them who had not enjoyed a spell of EPWP work.  Under these assumptions, with the possible 
                                                 
69 The same figures (referred to above in connection with Table 3) appear in the expenditure booklet (National 
Treasury, 2010b, p.12) 
70 Despite a commitment to making EPWP ‘jobs’ more worthwhile, it appears that like the Phase 1 ‘jobs’, Treasury 
acknowledges that mean duration of employment for Phase 2 will not be much more than 100 days (National 
Treasury, 2010a, p.51).  Clearly, this is because more than three quarters of the 4.5 million work opportunities to be 
provided will be in the Infrastructure and Environment sectors.   41
exception of Social sector participants, training makes little sense, and the wage can be fixed at 
some minimum.  Not much attention needs to be given to benefits. 
 
 










































Scenario A assumptions 
Year 1 – 2009/10  4165  958 48 5.0 30  3.1
Year 2 – 2010/11  4184  962 60 6.2 37  3.8
Year 3 – 2011/12  4147  954 83 8.7 51  5.3
Year 4 – 2012/13  4108  945 115 12.2 71  7.5
Year 5 – 2013/14  4067  935 156 16.7 96  10.3
Rest of 2014  4025  926 138 14.9 85  9.2
Scenario D assumptions 
Year 1 – 2009/10  4165  958 48 5.0 30  3.1
Year 2 – 2010/11  4151  955 60 6.3 37  3.9
Year 3 – 2011/12  4081  939 83 8.8 51  5.4
Year 4 – 2012/13  4007  922 115 12.5 71  7.7
Year 5 – 2013/14  3931  904 156 17.3 96  10.7
Rest of 2014  3851  886 138 15.6 85  9.6
 
 
That is the one extreme – the other is that once into the system, those filling the EPWP slots are 
re-appointed as each work opportunity is completed.  This is tantamount to EPWP participants 
becoming permanent quasi-government employees.  If this were to happen, although it would not 
affect the figures in Tables 5 and 6, the socio-economic effect on the unemployed would be very 
different from that in the previous scenario.  Instead of, say, a few million unemployed 
experiencing almost a year’s work at least once during the five-year period, at the start of the 
period, 210 000 people would enter full-time employment.  They would remain in those jobs, 
being joined by new recruits each year, until the number grew to 680 000 people at the end of the 
five-year period.  Under such conditions, training becomes a viable proposition.  In addition, 
wage levels and associated benefits would have to receive more careful attention. 
 
Rather obviously, neither of these extremes represents a likely outcome of Phase 2 of the EPWP 
– that is likely to lie somewhere between them.  Although it is not possible to say what that is 
likely to be, the compilers of the business plan should at least, present their speculations as to 
what the likely outcomes could be.  In practical terms, it is of vital importance to the design of 
the training programme, the single most important failure of Phase 1.  In welfare terms, it forms 
a basis for judging the efficacy of the programme. 
   42
Despite its importance, little is known about government’s intentions as far as the duration of 
EPWP work opportunities is concerned,  Let us spend a few moments looking at areas where 
clarification of policy intent would assist in understanding the socio-economic (as opposed to 
statistical) impact of the EPWP. 
 
Potentially, the EPWP may contribute to a reduction in unemployment by three means.  The first 
of these is the work opportunities provided directly by the programme.  Although the mean 
duration of EPWP jobs is (to be) about 90-100 days, it could well be much longer – the “Code of 
Good Practice for employment and conditions of work for Special Public Works Programmes” 
(DoL, 2002) stipulates in Section 7.3: 
 
“No person may be employed for more than 24-months within a 5-year cycle, except in 
circumstances where no other local labour is available.” 
 
It does not say, however, that the 24 months cannot be continuous (i.e., must be punctuated by 
‘rest’ periods).  A clear statement of government’s position on this question is necessary. 
 
The second contribution to reducing unemployment happens when some of the EPWP 
participants succeed in obtaining employment elsewhere (or in starting their own businesses) 
after going through the EPWP programme.  In the founding document referred to above, the 
EPWP revealed as an objective, the goal of increasing: 
 
“… the potential for at least 14% of public works participants to earn future income by 
providing work experience, training and information related to local work opportunities, 
further education and training and SMME development” (DPW, 2005a, p.11) 
 
Information from the monitoring and evaluation programme on the progress of the EPWP 
towards the achievement of this target (in propaganda terms, one of its most important), is 
urgently required – it should be placed before the public without delay. 
 
The last arises because the EPWP also creates some jobs that may be regarded as permanent.
71  
In Home and Community Based Care (HCBC), for example: 
 
“… job opportunities will be provided for relatively long periods, ranging from 12 to 24 
months.  Hence a high number of person years (170,000) will be created from the 120,000 
work opportunities.” (DPW, 2005a, p.17) 
 
Here again, the results of the monitoring and evaluation programme need urgently to be placed 
before the public.  In a country that is desperately short of community service workers, 
programmes of this sort are of self-evident importance.  More than just numbers, however, need 
to be provided.  If it is regarded as essential to monitor the quality of assets created under the 
infrastructure sector programme, how much more so is it necessary to know about quality, when 
it is a service that is being provided to those who are incapable of fending for themselves. 
 
                                                 
71 The 41 000 learnerships (37 000 in the social sector) proposed for Phase 1 of the EPWP (McCord, 2009, p.175) 
would also resemble permanent jobs.   43
Boasts about the numbers of work opportunities created by the EPWP may sound impressive.  
Until the information necessary to make a proper assessment of the socio-economic effects of the 
EPWP is made available, doubts will continue to be expressed about the ability of the 
programme to meet whatever its goals are.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Criticisms of aspects of the EPWP do not imply that public works programmes (PWPs) per se 
are without merit.  Well-designed and implemented, they can contribute handsomely to the goal 
of providing universal social protection.  The corollary, of course, is that poorly-designed and 
implemented, they can have the opposite effect.  It must also be acknowledged that it is much 
easier to be a critic than it is to be a designer and implementer.  That said, it must also be 
acknowledged that pinning too much hope on the contribution that the EPWP can make to 
addressing South Africa’s unemployment problem, as is sometimes done, can lead only to 
confusion. 
 
Clear statements expressing government’s belief (faith?) that unemployment will be halved by 
2014 are common – they have been trotted out over the years by several high-ranking politicians 
and party members.  By contrast, statements that the EPWP is there only to hold the fort until 
economic growth takes over and solves the unemployment problem, are not all that common.  
One example (doubtless there are others) may be found on the EPWP website, where, under the 
heading “Introduction”, one finds the following: 
 
“The EPWP is one of an array of government strategies aimed at addressing unemployment.  
The fundamental strategies are to increase economic growth so that the number of net new 
jobs being created starts to exceed the number of new entrants into the labour market, and to 
improve the education system such that the workforce is able to take up the largely skilled 
work opportunities which economic growth will generate.  In the meantime, there is a need to 




As noted in the first section of the paper, EPWP management has been quite explicit about the 
capacity of the programme to address South Africa’s unemployment problem.  The following 
statement cannot be misunderstood: 
 
“The EPWP will not solve the structural unemployment problem.  It is merely one element 
within a broader government strategy to reduce poverty through the alleviation and reduction 
of unemployment.” 
 
By the time 2014 comes around, the EPWP will be celebrating its tenth birthday.  Although 
short-, medium-, and long-term are not periods with precise boundaries, a decade must surely 
qualify at least as medium-term? (short-term = 2-3 years?).  If the speculations above about the 
likely size of the unemployment problem in 2014 are roughly correct, and if government 
                                                 
72 Downloaded from http://www.epwp.gov.za/index.asp?c=About#Introduction, 18
th April 2009.   44
perceptions do not change, the EPWP would be required for at least another decade, because in 
addition to the three million or so officially unemployed, there will also be some large number of 
discouraged workseekers to accommodate.  By no reasonable standard can a policy that is likely 
to stretch out for twenty years or more be described as ‘short- to medium-term’ – to do so would 
be to engage in self-delusion of a high order. 
 
Sooner or later, government is going to have to admit that jobs for some large number of people 
who lack even the most rudimentary skills are not about to be created by economic growth.  If 
government continues to insist that social protection for the able-bodied poor is going to be 
through provision of ‘job opportunities’ in ‘public work’, then some sort of employment 
guarantee scheme (EGS) is probably going to be necessary.  The EPWP already has some of the 
features of such schemes – and government is known to be flirting with the EGS idea (a couple 
of pilot schemes are underway).  My first reading of the reference in the AsgiSA annual report 
cited above about a “new modality for delivery … the Community Work Programme… ” (CWP) 
was that it possibly heralded a ridding of the elements that prevent the EPWP from being turned 
into an EGS.
73  The CWP is an ambitious project, which, if successful, could see some 
substantial number of the unemployed absorbed into, if not full-time employment, then at least 
regular paid work.  Some idea of the numbers being spoken about is given in Meth (2009b).  
There is a danger of CWPs being seen as another panacea – to avert this it is desirable for 
government to engage in open dialogue with civil society about social protection.  That, 
unfortunately, is unlikely to occur while government clings so desperately to its prejudices about 
social grants for the able-bodied poor. 
 
From the foregoing analysis, a number of imperatives emerge – they are listed below: 
 
  EPWP management should make public the full report of the results of its attempts to 
monitor and evaluate Phase 1 of the EPWP.  This should include a description of the M&E 
programme, and the ways in which this differs, if any, from that proposed in DPW (2005a) 
and that described in the Five Year Report (DPW, 2009b).  It should also include 
publication of an un-edited version of the mid-term programme review, which reportedly 
recommended the severing of the ‘employment opportunity’ and ‘training’ aspirations of 
the programme.
74 
  An interim poverty impact analysis of the EPWP should be undertaken as recommended 
in DPW (2005a, pp.31ff) – it was suggested that this be done in years 3 and 5 of the 
programme.  It would have been useful if the outcome had been compared with the effects 
of introducing social grants for unemployed adults. 
  EPWP management should produce reliable data on durations of employment spells of 
those who participate in the EPWP.  Data on the numbers who enjoy more than a single 
‘work opportunity’ should be made available, preferably by area and sector of 
employment. 
                                                 
73 Employment guarantee schemes, of course, are not without problems of their own – but that is another matter 
altogether, and not one that will be considered here.  A World Bank paper by Murgai and Ravallion (2005) suggests 
that the poverty reduction aims of the job guarantee schemes for India’s rural poor could possibly be more 
effectively achieved by means of social grants. 
74 An unpublished report by McCord (2007b) formed part of this review.   45
  An analysis of all the data generated by the LFSs (both cross-sectional and longitudinal) 
should be undertaken.  One point of this exercise should be to determine which questions 
in the LFSs were rubbish.  Another may be to see whether the LFS suggests that EPWP 
M&E data are rubbish. 
  A formal statement from Statistics South Africa on the reasons for shifting the EPWP 
survey questions from the LFS to the GHS at the time the QLFS was introduced, is 
required.  Some comment on the implications for analyses would be of assistance in 
helping to decide whether there is any point at all in collecting the information.  This 
question arises because the periods between surveys are so different (LFS: 6 months, 
QLFS: 3 months, GHS: 12 months) 
  The Department of Public Works should have placed before the public a draft of the 
EPWP Phase 2 strategy, so that comment could be offered.  If the figures being bandied 
about are to be believed, the programme is truly massive – a government truly committed 
to democracy would have encouraged participation in the design of Phase 2 from an early 
stage.
75 
  An explanation of how the manifest weaknesses in Phase 1 of the programme, especially 
those relating to training and employment duration, were to be addressed, should be 
provided.  The question of whether or not it is sensible even to attempt to link training 
with short-term employment creation needs to be thoroughly aired.
76 
  Government should make known the basis of its conviction that the unemployment 
halving target can be met.  Any models used in arriving at this conclusion should be 
submitted to full scrutiny. 
  Given that the combination of EPWP ‘work opportunities’ and jobs created through 
economic growth cannot solve the unemployment problem in the medium-term (a decade 
or more?), government should be required to spell out how it proposes to deal with the 
poverty of the millions of able-bodied adults who are without income. 
 
Until such time as government places before the public much more information than is presently 
available, the statements it chooses to make about addressing the problem of mass 
unemployment, whether by way of economic growth, or of the contribution of the EPWP to the 
goal of reducing unemployment, should be treated with the utmost circumspection.  EPWP 
management, without apparent irony, and after stressing repeatedly that the EPWP cannot solve 
the problem of structural unemployment, has taken to describing to itself as the ‘employer of last 
resort’.  The claim is hollow – if it were genuine, i.e., if anyone wanting paid employment were 
able to obtain it by appealing to the EPWP, South Africa would then have a fully-fledged 
employment guarantee scheme (EGS).  It manifestly does not.  The creation of low-paid, 
government-funded employment may not be the solution to the structural unemployment 
problem, but it would go some way towards creating income security for those millions who 




                                                 
75 The EPWP website, although filled with interesting documents, gave very little information on Phase 2, at the 
time this section of the paper was first drafted (July 2009).  In any case, the website is not readily accessible to all 
members of the public. 
76 A starting point for addressing this question may be found in McCord (2009, Chapter 7).   46
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